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JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE  
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**Executing Host Nation Elections in a Post-Conflict Environment: The CJTF's Role**

by

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United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in  
partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in  
Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect on my own personal views and are not necessarily  
endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink. The name "Jose" is at the beginning, followed by "H.", "Ocasio", and "Santiago". There is a small smiley face drawn next to the "i" in "Santiago".

1 June 2007

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Robert Antis

## ***ABSTRACT:***

The US Military and the US government have highlighted, through recent operations and the National Security Strategy respectively, that elections are a critical element in the success of post-conflict operations and the transitioning of a host nation to a democratic form of governance. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) are often required to support or lead host nation elections to facilitate the transition of a host nation to a representative form of government. In the last two major US conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan), CJTFs along with the host nation have been the main effort for the planning, preparation and execution of the elections. Prior to these conflicts, the international community led by UN and NGO entities, were primarily leading the electoral process. In the future, the military should be prepared to lead or support actions for the elections in the event the non-governmental and international organizations cannot support an election process. Although FM 3-07.31 Peace Ops, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations, provides some tactics, techniques and procedures, there is no well-defined civil military framework for a CJTF to prepare and execute elections. Whenever possible, CJTFs should take a supporting role to the execution of elections to present an unbiased approach to the process. Most tasks for election preparation and execution are primarily with UN along for the interagency, NGOs and host nation itself. Because of the strategic importance of elections, CJTFs support must be maximized for mission success. This monograph focuses on the framework necessary for a CJTF to execute or support elections in a post-conflict environment. The main sources used in researching this paper have been primary and secondary documents.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:**

This monograph exists as a result of my personal experiences with planning, preparing and executing elections while deployed to Kosovo in 2002 and in Iraq in 2004-05. During this period, I found myself as an Infantryman and a tactical planner leading or participating in planning sessions when there was little discussion on security for elections. I spent significant time in discussions on how to best conduct voter and political party registration, following electoral law, and at times, coordinating funding for election workers. The flexibility, patience, and energy required to support a host nation election was more extensive than I could have ever imagined. Managing elections is not a task I would be attempting to pursue in the future, however, the lessons from how the elements of national power work to execute elections and the importance of the use of these elements at the regional and local level were priceless. I truly believe that military officers that are successful in coordinating and executing elections in post-conflict operations can be successful anywhere. But no officer ever works alone, elections are no exception. I would first thank SFC(R) Rick Jelen, one of the non-commissioned officers who assisted me greatly in coordinating with Iraqis in their first ever elections. However, the host nation leaders, electoral commissions, and international organization coordinators are the ones who carry ‘the heavy load’ on elections.

The heroes of elections in post-conflict operations are those local leaders, who might never have experienced elections, but nevertheless do everything possible to ensure that the moral principles of conducting elections are met. From my two experiences while deployed conducting combat operations in Iraq, the efforts of two men helped me appreciate the work and importance that elections have on the populace. My lead interpreter, Najah Ibrahim, who while not ever experiencing elections previously, could so eloquently explain to many Iraqis the elections process and what it meant to the future of Iraq. The second was BG Eissa Abd Mahmood, the director of all the provincial coordination centers in Salah Ad Din Province, who amazingly coordinated the first ever elections. His leadership and mentoring helped me understand two

things that I will never forget. The first is that personalities and culture matter in preparing for elections. The second is that the ability to establish a representative form of government lies within the contents of the cultural traits of that society, not by forcing international cultural traits upon the host nation. While many critics expected that no one would vote in this predominantly Sunni province, BG Eissa Abd Mahmood managed to coordinate all key components to elections and created a miracle. He helped Iraq “Cross the Delaware River” on 30-31 January 2005. While the effects of the elections process have yet to be fully define the future of Iraq, it is worth to mention and credit the amazing work of thousands of Iraqis during the period of November 2004 through February 2005. No matter what the result of Operation Iraqi Freedom is, I personally was part on the one day where Iraqi citizens overwhelmingly defeated the insurgency, 30 January 2005.

Lastly, this monograph is a reality due to the support of my wife Kimberley. Especially during the period leading to the Iraqi elections, the multiple discussions over the phone about culture, helping people and never giving up helped me professionally and personally. Without her, I would have never had the inspiration and patience to be successful in performing my duties during the elections and to continue my military career after that deployment. She has been and always will be my center of gravity.

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Elections are often used as an intermediate strategic goal by the international community and the United States to transition a host nation in post-conflict operations to full sovereignty with a democratic form of governance.<sup>1</sup> In post-conflict operations, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) can provide the command and control, coordination, and security oversight necessary to conduct a successful election.<sup>2</sup> In doing so, the CJTF can help the international community gain a strategic momentum in a host nation seeking stability in post-conflict environment.<sup>3</sup> In Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the US military has been involved to some extent in the planning, preparation, and conduct of elections. In each of these instances, the CJTF had either a supporting or a leadership role in the elections depending on the strategic environment. As the international governments and the international organizations continue to rely on the US military's capabilities for command, control, and coordination, it is imperative to define the key considerations of a successful election, and how the CJTF can best support. **The thesis of this paper is if the CJTF is tasked to assist in the conduct of elections in post conflict operations, then the CJTF must have an operational framework to synchronize the execution of elections.**

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this thesis, post-conflict operations or post-conflict environment is defined as those stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations that are conducted by a CJTF in the period following conflict termination. This thesis will focus on post-conflict operations where the US has been involved. The use of other post-conflict events where the US was not or is not involved will be presented by exception

A host nation is defined as a sovereign nation state, which as a result of conflict (internal or external to its borders) will require to undergo a transition prevent further violence and regional instability. Initially the host nation may have lost its sovereignty, but as a result of the involvement by CJTF and / or international organizations, it will regain its sovereignty.

<sup>2</sup> When referring to the CJTF throughout this document, we refer primarily to CJTFs that the United States had participated in or will participate in the future. Examples of non-US involved CJTFs will be cited by exception.

<sup>3</sup> When referring to the "international community" or "international organization" during this document, we refer to intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, non-governmental organization, multilateral or bilateral agencies, philanthropic organization, relief agencies and private sector firms that are involved in the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction work in developing countries. While this includes a variety of organizations that may have different objectives and strategies, the terms are useful in referring to a set of international actors that can be considered a community.

This monograph is divided into four chapters. Chapter I includes the introduction, the strategic importance of elections and the role of the CJTF. This chapter helps the CJTF staff assess a strategic approach to an election in a post conflict environment. Chapter II defines at length the key components necessary for a CJTF to have successful elections. This chapter has direct applicability to the CJTF staff when assisting a host nation develop the strategy necessary to conduct post conflict elections. Chapter III presents an operational framework for the CJTF to utilize as a supported element to an internationally led electoral process or as the lead agency of the electoral process in a host nation. Additionally, this chapter presents an example of how the CJTF elections framework can be applied in CJTF contingency planning. Chapter IV provides the conclusion and future concepts for elections preparation in a Joint, Interagency and Multinational organizations. This monograph is designed so that a CJTF or a COCOM can utilize the entire document or individual chapters to prepare for post conflict operations at different levels.

The goals of this monograph are:

- ◆ Provide the reader with a greater appreciation of the complexities of elections and the importance of an election framework for the CJTF.<sup>4</sup>
- ◆ Demonstrate the need for the CJTFs to get involved as much as possible with international organizations, host governments and non-governmental organizations to determine the most appropriate role the CJTF will have in the elections.
- ◆ Present the environment that the CJTF must provide in order to maximize election coordination between the CJTF, interagency and international organizations.
- ◆ Show that the CJTF in the future will need to have the flexibility to lead or support a post-conflict election if the situation demands it, as it recently did in Iraq.
- ◆ Show that with a developed framework, a CJTF can work to minimize the involvement of military units at the organizational and tactical level in the execution of the election.
- ◆ The framework will provide the ability for the CJTF to easily identify gaps in the preparation of the elections and ensure that agencies are informed to participate. Further, it will define the capabilities necessary for execution while not decrementing the security capabilities of the CJTF.

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<sup>4</sup> In selected cases throughout this monograph, the author will draw upon personal experiences to provide examples that explain the complexity of planning, preparing and executing elections in post-conflict operations. The experiences will further reinforce references that have been provided throughout this monograph.

## **CHAPTER I – POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS OVERVIEW**

### **WHY MUST THE CJTF BE FULLY INVOLVED IN ELECTIONS?**

The military is not responsible for conducting elections..... The military should enable the host nation and international agencies to conduct successful elections. The extent of the support depends on the capacity of the agencies to conduct elections and the authority of the military force to act upon it.<sup>5</sup>

A CJTF needs to be involved in elections because recent history demonstrates the CJTF provides more than security for the elections. A CJTF is the most influential actor working in the development of nations as conflict ceases. When the capacity of the non-military agencies to conduct elections is weak, the CJTF must take up a more involved role, as the United States military did in Iraq during the 2005 elections. Additionally, the role of the host nation and how it prepares for the election can not be overlooked. It has been assessed that civil administration is most successful when working with the military regardless of the outcome of voter registration and voter participation.<sup>6</sup> In post-conflict operations, elections are important, with the most critical election being the first. Some of the strategic effects of a first election are:

- ◆ Providing confidence to the populace that a representative government can take shape.
- ◆ Setting the conditions for a legitimate representative body to prepare and present the political and national strategies for a host nation transition.
- ◆ Demonstrating to the international community that the host nation is transitioning to a representative government.
- ◆ Providing the influence necessary to donor nations to support the host nation in economic reconstruction – creating a “snowball effect” of support.

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<sup>5</sup> United States Army, *Field Manual FM 3-07.31, Peace Ops, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations*, pg. VI-5.

<sup>6</sup> US Government Accountability Office, *Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations*, GAO-02-707R, *GAO Reports*, Washington DC, 24 May 2002, pg. 8.

The CJTF has to shape the environment early by supporting the right interim leadership to ensure that the first elections are conducted properly.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, the CJTF cooperates with all electoral entities for operational and strategic success.<sup>8</sup> Because of the nature of irregular warfare, the lack of interagency cooperation, and the international relationships, the CJTF provides the most influence with the development of a host nation in post-conflict operations. In this chapter, historical examples from the last ten years are presented that show examples of CJTF involvement in elections for more than just security. This chapter will conclude with an analysis of the interagency, international and military influences in post-conflict operations.

### ***CJTF Involvement in Post-conflict Elections***

Almost every CJTF where the United States has been involved in support of host nation post-conflict operations has had additional tasks beyond security. The CJTF is capable of performing additional tasks in support of a host nation according to the Universal Joint Task List. The additional actions performed by the CJTF are strategic tasks of Developing and Maintaining Alliance and Regional Relations; Foster Multinational and Interagency Actions; and Operational Command and Control.<sup>9</sup> There are subordinate tasks performed by the CJTF with respect to intelligence, information operations, and elections based on the security situation. With respect to this monograph, intelligence and information operations will be considered part of the security tasks that a CJTF performs during all operations, not just for elections.

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<sup>7</sup> Interim leadership for a host nation government is enacted as a result of conflict (internal or external) where the fall of the government occurs. During most post-conflict operations, an international body (like the United Nations), an occupying military and its government (like the CJTF and US involvement in Iraq or Afghanistan) or the host nation itself will select and interim leadership to facilitate the transition from the end of the conflict to the return to a sovereign nation status. Examples of interim leadership have been the interim government led by now President Karzai in early 2002 in Afghanistan and by the Iraqi governing council created by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in late May 2003. Normally, interim leadership is replaced or legitimized by a selection process in the host nation through an elections process.

<sup>8</sup> When referring to electoral entities, it is all international, non-governmental and host nation organizations that are involved in the election. Some examples of electoral entities are The United Nations Elections Office, the host nation interim government electoral commission, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Office for Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE).

<sup>9</sup> Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCSM 3500.04C Universal Joint Task List*, 1 July 2002, pgs. D-15, D29, and D39.

The United States military has had increasing involvement in elections since 1996, when it was involved in post-conflict elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). In this scenario, the military force was able to do more than provide security for the elections because of the presence of international security support. The Implementation Force (IFOR), later called the Stabilization Force (SFOR), led by NATO under the Dayton Accords of 1995, provided the military security to the United Nations (UN) as it was conducting post-conflict operations. There were significant disagreements from the Dayton Accords between Serbs, Bosnians and Croatians. The CJTF contingent (IFOR / SFOR), maintained the necessary security to ensure that the disagreements between ethnic groups did not turn to violence. These actions included disarming combating elements and providing safe lines of communication, later expanding the SFOR mission to include civil military cooperation and restoration of essential services. To address the local security for elections the UN developed an International Police Task Force (IPTF) because of discussions during the Dayton Peace talks. Initially the IPTF consisted of 280 police officers, but it grew to over 3000 police officers by August of 1996, facilitating the local security functions for the elections.<sup>10</sup> The Organization of Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE) in support of UN was to be responsible for the overall execution of the elections. As OSCE conducted the assessment to execute elections, they became aware that they did not have the capabilities necessary to execute the tasks for the elections. As an example, OSCE's task organization was fragmented by local areas, making it very difficult for OSCE to have a coordinated effort for logistical support, public information and registration. Task Force (TF) Eagle, the US component of the CJTF, conducted a public information campaign with Psychological Operations elements to ensure that citizens understood the concept of national elections to help some of the tasks that OSCE had to

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<sup>10</sup> Robert M. Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We need Him? Americas's Search for a Post-Conflict Stability Force*, United States Institute of Peace Press, June 2004, Washington DC,119.

do.<sup>11</sup> As a result of the existence of the IPTF and its security abilities, IFOR had the flexibility to maximize efforts in other areas that did not involve security.

The IFOR entities prepared to cooperate in the elections as local security tasks being conducted by the IPTF allowed for the flexibility for this CJTF to employ many of its other capabilities available. Examples of tasks that IFOR assessed to be completed are listed in Figure 1.

No.	Function	Description	When/Frequency/How Long	Locations	What IFOR can provide?
14	Voter Registration	Registering displaced persons	Approximately four months before election day, for two months	Throughout BiH	Area security to reassure voters, ensure freedom of movement and prevent intimidation
15	Voter Registration	Application by displaced persons for absentee ballot	Approximately two months before Election Day	Throughout BiH	Area security to reassure voters, ensure freedom of movement and prevent intimidation
16	Human Rights	Publicize Human Rights activities	Now to departure of IFOR, daily and special campaigns	Throughout BiH	Use of radio/TV and printing facilities (for flyers)
17	Human Rights	Public meetings in support of freedom of expression and public assembly	Occasional	Throughout BiH	Area security
18	Human Rights	Return of refugees/displaced persons	Daily - starting May/June until departure of IFOR	Various locations in BiH	Escort and short- to mid-term area security
19	Chief of Staff	Movement of staff (air transport)	Daily/weekly	Wherever IFOR flies	Access to OSCE staff for air transport
20	Chief of Staff/ Security	Evacuation of staff	If security situation deteriorates rapidly	Various locations in BiH	Security and air transport
21	Chief of Staff/ Security	Bomb disposal	When required (on call)	Sarajevo (HQ), five regional centers, 30 delegations	EOD support
22	Chief of Staff/ Security	Emergency medical care for OSCE staff	Duration of IFOR stay for all OSCE staff particularly for Election monitors during the two weeks before Election Day	Throughout BiH	Emergency medical care
23	Chief of Staff/ Security	Medical evacuation for OSCE staff	Duration of IFOR stay	Throughout BiH	Emergency dustoff or ambulance to major medical facilities in BiH and Croatia

**Figure 1 - Extract of tasks performed by IFOR during BiH elections<sup>12</sup>**

This chart highlights the wide variety of additional tasks besides security, to include media support, escorts, registrations, and other tasks necessary for elections. In the American sector of this CJTF, TF Eagle executed many of these tasks by conducting and preparing meetings to facilitate cooperation in the execution of the elections.

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<sup>11</sup> Center For Army Lessons Learned. *BiH National Elections, Tactics Techniques and Procedures*, Newsletter 98-18, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 1998, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 15.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, pg. F-3.

In Afghanistan, the lack of suitable infrastructure to deliver information and election materials to the populace along with the unstable security environment forced the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A), the CJTF for this operation, to get involved with the support of elections beyond that of security tasks. Unlike the BiH elections, where the CJTF performed election tasks as a lone entity, CFC-A was able to work in cooperation with the host nation forces, UN entities and NGOs to execute elections tasks. Further, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) working alongside the CJTF provided additional security for the execution of the elections. Afghanistan provides an example in which the CJTF had an active role for the elections, supported the electoral entities and the host nation with additional tasks besides security, but was not the lead element in any tasks for the electoral process. Rather, the lead in conducting elections was held by a body created specifically for that purpose.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) created the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) in July 2003 to assist the Afghanistan Interim Administration to prepare for the national elections executed in October 2004.<sup>13</sup> The purpose of the JEMB was “to support the conduct of free, fair, universal and direct elections,” with additional tasks to “promote

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<sup>13</sup> The JEMB can be defined as an electoral commission. An electoral commission is an organization designed and approved by the authority within the host nation to manage the elections process. During post conflict operations it can be an international governing body, the host nation itself, an occupying force’s government. The electoral commission is to be impartial to any political parties or the host nation government’s agenda. When fully staffed and trained, it can provide:

- financial oversight of the elections process (it can manage funding in some cases)
- design and implement an ethical development process for the political parties and voters
- observation of the voter and political party registration
- observation of the campaigning process to ensure that it is in accordance with the intent of the electoral law designed
- hiring of the electoral workers
- plan and develop the logistical plan for the support of the elections
- provide recommendations to the security forces on critical areas to secure during the elections process
- and manage and coordinate a public information program for the citizens.

However, in post conflict operations, because of time and constraint of resources and specialists, the electoral commission may not be capable of executing all the functions mentioned with only host nation personnel. The CJTF and the international community will coordinate as applicable to ensure that as much of the capability for the electoral commission is developed prior to the electoral process. Throughout this monograph, all references to electoral commissions are in a post-conflict environment.

public knowledge of and participation in, the electoral process and to promote an environment in which Afghan citizens are able to fearlessly exercise their legitimate political rights.”<sup>14</sup> The JEMB security assessments, voter registration and coordination with NGOs provided the Afghan interim government with the ongoing electoral progress. The JEMB had international support from the UN with elections tasks and establishing processes. It also received funding from the European Union (EU), and other international entities provided logistical support and electoral training.<sup>15</sup>

The CJTF election support primarily focused on security tasks with additional supporting tasks that compliment the actions of the JEMB. These supporting tasks included JEMB logistical support, in extremis support (mass casualty event, quick reaction force requirements for electoral personnel, etc.) and public information campaigns. Some non-security tasks ordered by CJTF-76 were for all subordinate HQs to ensure that they conducted meeting engagements with local leaders to gain support for the elections and to increase liaison with electorate elements where applicable.<sup>16</sup> These types of orders provided the flexibility for commanders to work with election officials to drive to remote villages and locations in where the electoral official could deliver voting registration information, while the CJTF could assess the populace and gather intelligence for security operations. Further, the security coordination between the Afghan national police forces, ISAF (the security forces at that time responsible for securing Kabul, the Afghan capital) and the JEMB security directorate allowed for exchange of electoral and intelligence information, established criteria for emergency procedures, and maximized security. Lastly, CFC-A provided direct coordination with liaisons to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan elements (the JEMB, Global Risk Strategies – an organization

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<sup>14</sup> Joint Elections Management Body, *2004 Afghanistan Presidential Election Operational Outline*, acquired from Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 22 July 2004, pg.6.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, Chapter V.

<sup>16</sup> Combined / Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76), *Presidential Elections FRAGO briefing*, 14 September 2004.

CJTF-76 was the operational headquarters for CFC-A during the 2004 and 2005 elections.

responsible for the security of UNAMA and Afghan leaders) which proved to be a key element in the ability of the CJTF to pass information and gain information to support the elections.<sup>17</sup>

As opposed to the CJTF support role in Afghanistan, Iraq provides an example of the CJTF having to lead the elections. The lack of effort by the interim host nation government and the international community, coupled with an adaptive enemy, forced the CJTF to lead the elections and perform several actions not commonly performed by a military force. As a result, the Iraqi elections have proven to be the most challenging for the CJTF to support.

Iraq was the first time since WWII that the United States designed and determined the governing process and procedures for another sovereign nation before gaining approval from UN. Under most situations, the international or non-governmental agencies get involved first to determine the government structure in post-conflict operations and the occupying military adheres to the selection and procedures for governance. From post-conflict operations in April 2003, the Department of Defense with CJTF-7 was fully involved in the development of the Iraqi government and its authorities. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) assisted the CJTF in the reconstruction process and transitioning of the Iraqi regime.<sup>18</sup> The strategic document for the transition of the government was the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which defined the electoral system, the role of US forces and the sovereignty of the Iraqi people starting 28 June 2004. The TAL was unanimously supported with UN Resolution 1546 / Coalition Military Mandate, which expanded on the legal status of US forces in Iraq during the transitioning period after 28 June 2004.<sup>19</sup> The TAL, signed on 8 March 2004, defined the future governing body for Iraq. The end result of this document was that the CPA would cease to exist in June 2004, leaving CJTF-7, as it transitioned

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<sup>17</sup> Combined / Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76), *Presidential Elections Lessons Learned Brief*, 15 October 2004.

<sup>18</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Iraq: US Regime Efforts and Post Saddam Governance*, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 16 May 2005, 17.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, pg. 19.

to the Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) and Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), to bear the burden of supporting the new Iraqi interim government.

In Iraq, the development of an electoral commission by the international community was hindered by the security situation. While the UN, in conjunction with the Afghan government, developed the JEMB, in Iraq this was not the case. The United Nations, with support from international judges and election experts developed the Independent Electoral Commission – Iraq (IEC-I).<sup>20</sup> This organization was originally created in May 2004 by the CPA. The UN advised the IEC-I, but was not responsible for supervising the elections or making key decisions.<sup>21</sup> The key decisions were made by the Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I), in conjunction with the interim government. The after action review brief, contains specific discussions as to the relationship between IEC-I, MNF-I, and its operational subordinate command, Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC-I). IEC-I was not involved with MNF-I until September 2004 and not fully engaged in the electoral process until December 2004.<sup>22</sup> With little oversight by the UN, the UN involvement was minimal; the military entities provided most of the ideas on executing elections to IEC-I, rather than the opposite, which is how it should normally operate.<sup>23</sup> The lack of support and coordination from the host nation at the national level led to even more dysfunction at the provincial and local levels. One example of this lack of support resulted in Soldiers providing elections materials to Iraqis during combat patrols in order to inform them of the elections process.<sup>24</sup> The CJTF understood that the International Elections Commission – Iraq was incapable of executing the multitude of tasks required for the conduct of the election.<sup>25</sup> Despite all the challenges, the elections were executed and considered fair and impartial, a positive

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<sup>20</sup> From [http://www.ieciraq.org/English/Frameset\\_english.htm](http://www.ieciraq.org/English/Frameset_english.htm) accessed 10 December 2006.

<sup>21</sup> From <http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/iraq/election-fact-sht.htm> accessed 10 December 2006.

<sup>22</sup> Multinational Corps Iraq, After Action Review Meeting Notes, 7-8 Feb 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Multinational Corps Iraq, *Memorandum for Record: After Action Review on 30 Jan 05 Iraqi Elections*, 13 February 2005, p 4.

<sup>24</sup> This example will be further discussed in Chapter 3 of this monograph.

<sup>25</sup> Colum Lynch, *U.S. Troops' Role in Iraqi Elections Criticized; UN Official Assails Distribution of Materials*, The Washington Post, 27 January 2005, pg. A14.

benchmark in the progress of Iraq toward a more democratic form of government. However, it is still uncertain whether a democratic process will take hold.

In other situations, the CJTF has focused primarily on security tasks and performed few additional tasks in support of elections. During the Kosovo campaign, the CJTF was involved in elections as part of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). OSCE was responsible for the election process, however they had learned from experiences in the previous election operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Additionally, an interim leadership for Kosovo, United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), was created through UNSCR 1244. OSCE's methodology to handle Kosovo elections in a manner that allowed the CJTF to be only responsible for security is described in the following paragraph.

OSCE created an organization in 1990 that became the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). ODIHR was responsible for conducting analysis in how to execute the electoral process in Bosnia-Herzegovina but it did not provide the guidance for elections. Instead, OSCE was forced to use its own assets to manage the electoral system. In Kosovo, ODIHR recommended and further created Municipal Election Commissions (MECs) designed to be impartial to the local political environment. The MECs in Kosovo allowed OSCE to focus on the logistical and information actions for the elections, while allowing the local populace to exercise and oversee the electoral process.<sup>26</sup>

Additionally, UNMIK provided the necessary police in the form of 3,155 UNMIK police officers as well as constabulary elements from countries that were participating in the CJTF.<sup>27</sup> The US contingent of the CJTF, TF Falcon, discussed in detail the after action review and their focus on security operations, explaining how OSCE, through joint meetings and coordination was

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<sup>26</sup> Andrew Taylor, *This Election Was Never Going to be Perfect. The Kosovo Municipal Elections of October 2000 as Post-Conflict Elections*, pg. 79.

<sup>27</sup> Robert M. Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We need Him? America's Search for a Post-Conflict Stability Force*, pg. 189.

able to execute the majority of tasks for the election.<sup>28</sup> This example illustrates when qualified and sufficient international involvement is present, the military element can focus on security operations.

### ***CJTF Influence in Post-conflict Operations***

The second reason why the CJTFs must be fully involved with the process of elections is the influence that the CJTF brings to a host nation. As seen in the examples provided above, the CJTF brings capabilities to the host nation in post-conflict operations beyond that of security. When military entities participate in post-conflict operations, it is more likely that policies, funding, and information will be available for the host nation to proceed in stabilization and reconstruction.

From the host nation's perspective, the CJTFs will maintain contact and influence host nation leadership and their local populace because of the nature of combat operations. However, that influence is limited by the presence of the other elements of national power; diplomacy, information, and economics. When the civilian entities that are responsible for the other elements of national power are not present to influence as the CJTF does for the military, an additional burden of responsibility is added. The military is left with no recourse but to have to develop or assist in the development of the host nation government as well as provide stability during post-conflict operations. Within the United States government, civilian participation in post-conflict operations has been limited because of the lack of legislation to ensure that consistent governmental civilian support is available to be present in post-conflict operations.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, the CJTF must have a level of understanding and capabilities to involve itself in elections in post-conflict operations.

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<sup>28</sup> Rich DuBreuil, Joseph Nowick, *Army News From the Front The Kosovo Elections*, Center For Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS. March-April 2001, pg.7.

<sup>29</sup> Nina M. Serafino, Martin A. Weiss, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities* Congressional Research Service for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 28 June 2005, pgs. 1, 4.

## THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS

Elections are the most visible sign of a free society and can play a critical role in advancing effective democracy<sup>30</sup>

In post-conflict operations, elections provide (in an “ends = ways + means” model) the ‘ways’ to meet the ‘objective’ of host nation government attaining a representative government.

In post-conflict operations, the CJTF and the international community will normally involve themselves with the development of governance considered democratic in nature.<sup>31</sup> A key task for the CJTF and the international community in accomplishing success in post-conflict operations is to be able to transition the sovereignty back to the host nation. As shown in the previous chapter, the CJTF will primarily be involved in setting the conditions to execute the elections.

In order to understand the strategic importance of elections, analysis of elections with respect to their relation to democracy and the impact of electoral system selection have in developing a government in post-conflict operations is required. The importance of elections conducted properly is that they provide a system of governance by electoral support, provide focus of effort for the international community, and can provide stability in terms of security and economics. Over time, the stability with respect to security and economics can lead to some of the components of a democratic society. When elections do not go as planned, or are not integrated into an overall strategic plan for bringing a democratic process the opposite effect occurs.

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<sup>30</sup> United States Government, The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House Press, 16 March 2006, 5.

<sup>31</sup> For the purpose of this thesis, we will refer to representative government of the individual as democratic government.

### ***Election's Relationship To Democracy***

Elections and democracy are mutually supportive of each other by definition; elections are necessary in order for the CJTF and the international community to transition the host nation to a democratic government in post-conflict operations. Webster's Dictionary defines democracy as, "a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation, usually involving periodically held free elections."<sup>32</sup> Other functions of national power influence the transition of a host nation government to stability in post-conflict operations. Elections alone do not work.<sup>33</sup> However, the actions performed to plan and execute elections provide the momentum necessary to gain and maintain stability in the host nation and lead the groundwork for a future democratic process.

Durable and stable democracy requires time to be fully developed. The perception in the United States of those not involved in establishing a democratic form of government is that the United States electoral process is a standard to develop host nation representative governments. This perception leads to an expectation at the operational and strategic level in where the US participates in a CJTF that a model of democracy can be quickly implemented in post-conflict operations to facilitate an exit strategy. The model of a democracy that is used is the United States. Initial analysis may lead one to consider the United States electoral process as a standard to define a government that represents the citizens, but the reality is that the US electoral process has taken time and multiple adjustments. In addition to an electoral system that selects the president, there were amendments to the constitution where adjustments were made to ensure that the process worked properly and representation of the citizens occurred.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Webster's Dictionary, <http://mw1.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democracy>, accessed on 15 September 2006.

<sup>33</sup> In accordance with Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 29 September 2006, Chapter 1 the elements of national power are Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics, Finance, Intelligence, Law Enforcement – DIMEFIL.

<sup>34</sup> Amendments XII, XVII, XXII, XXIII, XXVI of the United States Constitution.

The United Nations and the United States influence on Germany and Japan after World War II, were some of the first efforts in post-conflict operations to implement elections as a means to bring democratic development, stability, and the value of individual rights to nations that had been plagued with war or internal conflict. In both of these countries it took almost 10 years after the initial elections for both countries to fully implement in a representative form of government.

In the last 20 years, there has been a significant increase in the democratic process through elections. Of 147 countries with data, 121 comprising 68% of the world's population had some or all elements of formal democracy in 2000.<sup>35</sup> This compares with only 54 countries with 46% of the world's people in 1986.<sup>36</sup> Eighty-one countries have taken significant steps in the democratization while six have regressed.<sup>37</sup> Every democracy has elections that theoretically value the rights of an individual to select the leadership of his / her choice. That 'choice' is the key to a democratic process.

### ***Impact of Electoral System Selection***

The electoral process of developing democracies has been refined as a result of US and international involvement during the post-conflict period. The electoral system is one of the strategic tools used to determine the transition of a host nation in post-conflict operations to a democracy. In the last fifteen years, the electoral system design has been critical in determining the best form of democracy in post-conflict operations. While most associate elections with an act of voting at a booth, the vote is only a minor part of the electoral system that is used.

The design of an electoral system significantly influences the future of a host nation and the actions of a CJTF during post-conflict operations. The electoral system, as implemented by

<sup>35</sup> Some of elements of formal democracy are a constitution that promotes individual freedoms, a representative government elected by the people and the authority of the rule of law.

<sup>36</sup> Newman and Rich, *The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality*, United Nations University Press 2004, 208.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, pg. 207.

the electoral process, influences the strategic direction in which the host nation will be governed.

In most cases, an interim government will be put in place to facilitate the development and enactment of an electoral system. It is at this point, when a host nation government is determining the best electoral system, where the CJTF and the international organizations come together to assist the interim government. In order to support the host nation requirement to develop a framework for elections, CJTFs and its subordinate organizations must understand of the various options of an electoral system for the host nation.

An electoral system translates the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and candidates, ultimately the determinant as to what type of government will lead the citizens of that host nation. According to the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) electoral systems come into being in four ways in post-conflict operations:

- ◆ They can result from the peace process negotiations between communal groups seeking to bring an end to division or war. In these circumstances, the electoral system choice may not be open to full public scrutiny or debate.
- ◆ The system may be effectively imposed by the groups responsible for post-conflict political reconstruction (like the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq in 2003-2004)
- ◆ An expert commission may be set up to investigate the electoral system necessary.
- ◆ Citizens may be involved more widely in the design process by the establishment of a non-expert citizens' assembly on the electoral system.


Figure 2, extracted from IDEA's handbook of electoral systems, defines the types of electoral systems.<sup>38</sup>

There are fifteen different types of electoral systems recognized that are grouped into four different categories. There is a correlation between the electoral system and the strategic and operational actions that the CJTF will take to transition to a host nation. The distinguishing feature of Plurality / Majority systems is that they usually use single member-districts. The

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<sup>38</sup> Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly and Andrew Ellis, eds. *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, June 2005, pg. 15.

rationale for all Proportional Representation systems is to reduce the disparity between a political party's share of the national vote and its share of the parliamentary seats. Mixed electoral systems are created from using functions from all or some the electoral systems. A mixed electoral system can contain portions of plurality/majority systems, proportional representation systems and/or another electoral system independently of each of the electoral systems mentioned. The other forms of electoral systems do not fit any of the other three families of systems aforementioned. A more detailed analysis of which common electoral systems are used in post-conflict operations and the challenges to a CJTF will be presented in Chapter II.



**Figure 2 - The Electoral Systems of Families<sup>39</sup>**

Over the last fifteen years, there have been examples where the selection of an electoral system has not been carefully considered and as a result, the effects of the elections did not provide the necessary democratic process development. Countries like Haiti and most recently Iraq have shown that elections alone have not led to the development of effective democracies

<sup>39</sup>Ibid, p 29.

with those countries. In the case of Haiti, the international community has had to intervene several times since 1934 to provide stability. Elections have occurred in 1988, 1993, 1995 and 1997, and several times since 2000. The CJTF was involved in liberating and supporting the development of the Haitian government as part of Operation Uphold Democracy. The CJTF deployment occurred in September 1994 with the task to restore stability and ensure public safety in preparation for the return of President Aristide.<sup>40</sup> The CJTF departed in March 1995 and transitioned to a United Nations contingent. The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) took over the operation on 31 March 1995, with a smaller security force with the focus to develop the electoral system in Haiti. The United Nations decided along with the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council's (PEC) recommendation to continue the use of a Two Round System (TRS) as an electoral system. TRS is designed to determine a majority of voting by conducting multiple rounds of voting until the political party with most votes stands out. Although there had been elections conducted prior, the more than seventy political parties that participated in the elections had very little experience with elections. Most political parties lacked the popular support needed to win the elections.<sup>41</sup> Additionally the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council was unfamiliar with the management and funding for the elections. From June 1995-December 1995 there were five elections held, three for local elections and two for national elections. As a result of TRS as an electoral system, the number of elections led to corruption by leaders, a declining voter turn out, and a lack of technical and logistical training for political entities.<sup>42</sup> TRS is the most costly and complex of all forms of electoral systems and requires the most support from all supporting agencies. TRS is also susceptible to party system break up as time progresses.<sup>43</sup> However, in the

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<sup>40</sup> James F. Dobbins, Seth Jones, McGinn, Crane, Rathmell, Teltschik and Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Rand Corporation, 2003, pg. 75

<sup>41</sup> Krishna Kumar, Marina Ottaway, *Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance – “General Conclusions and Priorities for Policy Research”*, Lynne Publishers, London, 1998, p 75

<sup>42</sup> Reynolds, p 156

<sup>43</sup> International Republican Institute, *Haiti – Election Observation Report, abbreviated version*; IRI, Washington DC, 17 December 1995, p 17-19.

last twenty years, there has been little support by the government to privatize services and provide economic reforms to execute a TRS system properly.<sup>44</sup> TRS requires a form of security presence for a significant period, however all international security agencies departed in 1996, not long enough time for a trained security force to develop. Today the government led by Rene Preval is not representative of the populace, and according to ABC's investigative report Nightline, 'it is unstable for the Haitian people to have a coherent democracy'.<sup>45</sup>

Another example of where elections are still in question as to being able to provide a democracy, development, and stability is in Iraq. With minimal considerations to international analysis of the governance of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority selected List Proportional Representation (List PR) governance as the electoral system for Iraq. A List PR system involves each political party presenting a list of candidates to the electorate in each multi-member electoral district. The advantages are that it allows minority groups to be elected more easily, it is low cost, and sustainable. The disadvantages of List PR are that it may result in weak links between elected legislators and their constituents, excessive power within political party leadership, and is difficult to implement in new democracies.<sup>46</sup> In January 2005, elections were held in Iraq to elect an interim governing body that would develop the constitution. There were additional elections in December 2005 to determine the national leadership of Iraq. These elections have allowed for initial phases of a democratic government to take place. However, the country is not considered stable due to the security situation, economic imbalance, and sectarian divides.<sup>47</sup> Instability in Iraq may be occurring because of one of the disadvantages of the list PR. There are issues with the political power as the multitude of political parties take up arms in the name of religion or

<sup>44</sup>. Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*, pg. 83.

<sup>45</sup> Nightline news, 2004, *Failed Nation Building: A Case Study*, 18 February 2004, ABC news.

<sup>46</sup> Reynolds, pgs. 60, 61, 156.

<sup>47</sup> Unknown, CNN producer, *Three years later: Insecurity, instability and hope in Iraq*, Friday, March 17, 2006; Posted: 3:22 p.m. EST (20:22 GMT) viewed 9 October 2006 on CNN.com.

Mohammed Tawfeeq and Arwa Damon, *Sectarian violence stalks Iraq on holy day: Officials urge end to revenge attacks after mosque bombing* February 23, 2006; accessed on 9 October 2006 at <http://www.cnn.com>.

ethnicity. Additionally, Islamic organizations like Muqthada Al-Sadr's militia, have political influence which weakens the capability of the current government. List PR electoral systems work best where political parties are fully defined, the power play of growing political coalitions is acceptable and excessive entrenchment of power within party headquarters is not prevalent.<sup>48</sup> Iraq will continue to be unstable as long as the central government centralizes power in its political parties and not through representation at the provincial level. Provincial elections are scheduled for sometime in 2007 and should alleviate disadvantage of voter representation at all levels. This particular case demonstrates that elections, although critical to the development of a democratic society, do not guarantee stability. Security and economic stability provide the baseline to facilitate stability and a possibility for a democracy to take place. These two items will be discussed further in Chapter II.

## **CHAPTER I SUMMARY**

A CJTF should be involved with elections for more than security due to critical strategic value of an election. It is in the strategic interests of the United States that elections are executed to promote and develop effective democracies abroad. The National Security Strategy (NSS) utilizes elections as one measurement of success of democracies. As part of the United States national strategy, elections are one of the tools used to help with relationships with future countries, terminate oppression and develop future nations.<sup>49</sup>

As a result of the CJTF in extensive involvement in post-conflict operations, it should be deliberately influential in the planning execution of elections. The strategic value of the CJTF's involvement in the electoral process will significantly impact the transition of the host nation government into a democracy. Another measure of success for the CJTF is dependent on the ability of the host nation government to have control of the situation during post-conflict

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<sup>48</sup> Reynolds, pgs. 118-119.

<sup>49</sup> United States Government, The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House Press, 16 March 2006, pg. 4.

operations. Therefore, the CJTF must study and understand the key areas to focus on when preparing for elections and plan a framework in which to execute elections in post-conflict operations. Chapter II will define the areas that the CJTF must study and analyze in order to have mission success in the elections and gain strategic momentum during post-conflict operations. Chapter III will define the framework for the CJTF to use for elections during a host nation transition to stability during post-conflict operations.

## **CHAPTER II – THE ELECTIONS ENVIRONMENT – WHAT DOES THE CJTF NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND ABOUT ELECTIONS?**

“The will of the people – expressed in genuine, democratic elections- is the basis of authority of any democratic government. That authority can not be established unless voters make a free and informed choice among the political contestants. The mass communications media (public information) provide information to most voters that are essential to the choice they exercise at the ballot box. Therefore, proper media conduct toward all political parties and candidates as well as proper media conduct the presentation of information that is relevant to electoral choices, are crucial to achieving democratic elections.”<sup>50</sup>

This chapter proposes the considerations at an operational and strategic level for a CJTF to take action in preparation for elections. Field Manual 3-07.31, Peace Ops does not fully define the elections environment in post-conflict operations. The publication dedicates approximately three and a half pages to explaining that elections are important, however, the role of the CJTF is to focus on the security measures and logistical support requests. This document only explains that actions for the elections must be coordinated with the element in charge of the election (electoral commission, NGO or IO).<sup>51</sup> These considerations are tactical in nature, failing to provide considerations at the operational and strategic level of the execution of elections. There are tactics, techniques and procedures to be learned from the effects of electoral systems, the effects of electoral systems on the CJTF, and how to best empower the host nation during elections. Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that the methodology provided in the field manual is only somewhat efficient at best. Thus, a framework for executing elections cannot be developed out of the material currently in doctrine.

There are nine mutually supporting considerations of elections in post-conflict operations where the CJTF must have understanding in order for it to be involved effectively. In post-conflict operations, the CJTF may take part in some or all aspect of the elections based on the

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<sup>50</sup> Robert Norris, and Patrick Merloe, *Media Monitoring to Promote Democratic Elections – An NDI Handbook for Citizen Organizations*, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, USAID, Washington, DC, 2002, p i.

<sup>51</sup> United States Army, *Field Manual FM 3-07.31, Peace Ops, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations*, Chapter VI, paragraph 5.

capabilities of the host nation and the international supporting agencies. The key considerations to the success of an election in post-conflict operations are security, economic support, electoral administration, public information program, ethical development, logistic preparation, governance and leadership, international oversight, and detailed observer plan. Figure 3 provides a visual representation to how these considerations relate to one another and in relation to the center of gravity during the elections, the host nation populace. This figure provides a frame of reference throughout this chapter.




Figure 3 - Key Considerations for Elections in Post-conflict Operations<sup>52</sup>

When the CJTF synchronizes the key considerations of elections as a part of a campaign plan, it provides the momentum necessary for mission success. The framework that the CJTF

<sup>52</sup> The development of the Key Considerations for Elections in Post-conflict Operations is in large part drawn from the author's experience from multiple operational deployments in Kosovo and Iraq conducting post-conflict elections. See the 'Acknowledgements' and 'About the Author' sections for detailed background on the location, and level that the elections were conducted. Whenever possible, references will be presented that additionally support the position of this design.

will use for elections based on the considerations in Figure 3 will be defined in Chapter III. The key considerations are based on actions that international organizations, host nation and the CJTF have performed in the past to support host nation elections in post-conflict operations. Further, each component will be discussed individually with respect to the importance to the success of elections and what the CJTF should look for if involved in executing that component during elections.

All key considerations for elections in post-conflict operations are centered on the populace of the host nation. Security and economic support are ‘the foundations’ on which every post-conflict operation, including elections, are founded upon. Providing security is the primary task to be performed by CJTF during post-conflict operations, whether or not elections take place. Economic support for the elections include to all financial actions that help facilitate the logistical process for the elections, campaigning by political entities, and salaries for all elements that participate in the elections. The CJTF will likely not be the lead entity for economic development. However, it should conduct a thorough analysis of the host nation’s internal economic capabilities and the economic support available by the international community. This also applies to all other considerations where the CJTF may be not be lead entity.

Electoral administration, public information, logistic training and ethical development are considered ‘the pillars’ for elections because they must hold together the ability to focus elections. Electoral Administration defines the regulations, agreements, electoral design, and other written authorities or guidance necessary to execute an election. Public information is the ability for truthful, timely and resourceful information necessary to the populace in order to allow the populace to make educated decisions on elections. Ethical development is the training of leaders of the host nation at all levels and including the electoral commission and the local populace to understand the ethics to conducting fair and impartial elections. Accomplishing ethical development in the host nation will lead to the success of the future of a representative form of government remaining past the elections. Logistical preparation is the ability to ensure

host nation or international resources are available to provide the materials to execute elections; subsistence in the form of money, food, and supplies to those participating in the elections, and the infrastructure necessary to host the elections.

International oversight, observer plan, and host nation governance and leadership are the ‘validating functions’ for a successful election in post-conflict operation. The validating functions send the message to the citizens of the host nation and the international community the progress of the host nation to transition to a stable environment. International oversight is the ability for the non-military international organizations, and foreign governments to provide support to the host nation for post-conflict elections. Some acts of the international oversight include foreign leadership support to the interim host nation government, financial and educational assistance to the electoral commission and logistical support for the elections. Some acts of the international oversight include foreign leadership support to the interim host nation government, financial and educational assistance to the electoral commission and logistical support.

Host nation governance and its leadership component to the elections is the main effort to ensure that elections are fair and impartial and focused on the local populace. If the interim government of a host nation provides the necessary leadership and influence to transition the populace to embrace the forms of representative government by the conduct of elections, it will facilitate successful implementation of the other key considerations.

Lastly, every election requires legitimacy through an observer plan that is impartial all levels during the preparation of the elections. As part of their duties, they can make suggestions and corrections within their authority. Ultimately, election observers provide valid assessments to the execution of the elections and a prognosis to the future of the host nation.

All key considerations for elections are necessary and none are mutually exclusive to one another. The complete failure of one component in preparation for election can affect the effectiveness of another component or all components. Thus, it is important for the CJTF staff to

be familiar with some of the issues that must be observed in preparation and execution of an election in a post-conflict operation.

## **FOUNDATIONS FOR ELECTIONS**

### ***Electoral Security***

In post-conflict societies, the remnants of wartime military and security apparatuses pose great risks to internal security: inflated armies with little or not civilian control; irregular and paramilitary forces; and overabundance of arms and ammunition in private and government hands; weak internal security forces; and a lack of trust in and legitimacy of the governments control over police and military forces.<sup>53</sup>

- Albercht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Erhart

The security environment defined above has a significant effect on the host nation's ability to conduct elections after major combat operations. This monograph defines electoral security as all actions necessary to allow citizens and leaders to participate physically and verbally in the elections with minimal risk of loss of life or intimidation.<sup>54</sup> In post-conflict operations, a number of different entities may threaten the security situation and elections of a host nation. With respect to elections, threats range from defeated warring parties and criminal activity, to external security forces (a foreign nation state), remnants of the military threat and disgruntled political parties and non-state actors (terrorists and newly created militias).<sup>55</sup> For electoral security, the CJTF will normally be tasked to coordinate and provide the security effort for elections along with host nation security forces and any other intervention security forces

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<sup>53</sup> From Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, analyzing Newman, Edwards and Schnabel's information from "Recovering from Civil Conflict: reconciliation, Peace and Development, pgs. 1-6.

<sup>54</sup> As studied by author from Fisher, Jeff, *Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention*, International Foundation for Election Systems White Paper 2002-01, International Foundation For Election Systems, accessed on 17 January 2006 from website of United Nations Network in Public Administration and Finance ([www.unpan.org](http://www.unpan.org)), 5 February 2002.

<sup>55</sup> For purposes of this monograph, the enemy against the elections process is categorized in two different types. The first are defined as adversaries, enemies of the host nation government and the electoral process who will not take up arms against the nation, however, they will create obstacles and create an environment to prevent process of a representative government to take place. Normally, these enemies can be handled by host nation local forces or by influencing the populace to not support any of their rhetoric. The second form of enemy will be defined as the threat, adversaries or organizations that take up arms against the host nation government or the occupying military force assisting in the transition. The threat can be non-state actors, such as terrorist and militias or other nations states interested in taking over an unstable situation.

(United Nations Civil Police - UNCIVPOL, contracted elements) against these threats. Two major areas when dealing with security are important to understand for the CJTF. First, the CJTF must understand what actions to take against these various threats. Second, it must assess the security forces available and their capabilities versus the security tasks required to address the challenges to electoral security.

As the CJTF considers the actions against threat elements in post-conflict operations in order to facilitate the execution of electoral security, there are three options on how to handle and respond to the threat: eliminate it, incorporate it, or transform it. This means that the threat has to be physically destroyed, has to be incorporated into the legitimate security element of the host nation, or the threat is transformed by disarming and it agrees to meet their objectives through the host nation's political system. Therefore, the CJTF is challenged to respond to defeating the threat as well as defining the ways in which the threat will be incorporated in the constructive future of the host nation. The CJTF must keep in mind that most threats have been in some sort of conflict with the host nation before or during the CJTF intervention. Therefore, these threats cannot be 'wished away'.<sup>56</sup> While the CJTF may have expertise in combating the threat with kinetic operations, it should consider non-kinetic approaches to transforming the adversarial elements into the security or political environment of the host nation. Terrence Lyons introduces three additional factors to consider when combating threats in a post-conflict environment when attempting to implement an election: effective interim administration, transformation of warring elements into political parties or security institutions and construction of electoral authorities that are credible to all parties.<sup>57</sup> What the CJTF can do to help develop an effective interim administration and electoral authorities that are credible to all political parties will be discussed in

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<sup>56</sup> Rotberg, Robert (eds), *When States Fail, Causes and Consequences*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2004, pgs. 271-273.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, pg. 273.

the Electoral Administration section of this chapter. It is important to elaborate on the transformation of warring elements in the context of electoral security.<sup>58</sup>

Krishna Kumar reaffirms that most of the internal elements that are considered a threat to elections exist because the militant or political elements were unable to transform themselves into political parties of the new host government.<sup>59</sup> This transformation fails to occur as a result of one or more of the three situations below:

- ◆ **Threat organization believed that it could impose its beliefs and represent their people through coercion and violent means.** This could mean that the threat group will be armed or has military type capabilities to fight the interim security establishment.
- ◆ **The threat element believed that it could not win the elections; therefore, they threaten the populace with fatal consequences if they do.** In this situation, the threat may have a capability to inform the populace quickly and may have an armed capability to attack if the elections occur.
- ◆ **The threat elements may lose capability for monetary gain.** In this event, the threat may be criminal activity and while this threat might allow the citizens to vote, it may influence ‘who’ is selected so as to maintain the criminal activity.<sup>60</sup>

One of the non-kinetic actions that the CJTF can take to address all these consequences is an aggressive information campaign that persuades entities to carry out their political aims through a democratic process. The information campaign must be coordinated with all elements involved in the elections. This means that the messages about the electoral process must be the same from the host nation, CJTF and any other international element involved in the elections. Further, the message must be delivered at all levels (local, regional and national) and to locations where the threat can recruit for their cause. The ability of an interim government to express how elections are a part of nation building and that political aims can be met through this system may prove to be influential for the threat to disarm, demobilize and take part in the electoral process.<sup>61</sup> Along with the non-kinetic actions, the CJTF has to have military ‘muscle’ to take kinetic action

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<sup>58</sup> In discussion of the threat elements, the “warring elements” will be included in the discussion of what the CJTF will transform to eliminate threat.

<sup>59</sup> Krishna Kumar, Marina Ottaway, *Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance – “General Conclusions and Priorities for Policy Research”*, p 8.

<sup>60</sup> Fisher, pgs. 9-10.

<sup>61</sup> Krishna Kumar, Marina Ottaway, pg. 231.

if the threat wishes not to transform. The strength of the CJTF must also contend with threats that have no interest in the political environment, for example criminal activity or external adversaries trying to invade. In both of these cases, the CJTF will utilize military action to deter and destroy any opposing force. Thus, the CJTF has to have a security element that is robust at a local, regional and national level and uphold the law as that will not be influenced by criminal activity. The composition, disposition and capabilities of the security force are the second element for the CJTF to consider in preparation.

The assessment of the required capabilities of security forces is something that the CJTF is familiar with during security operations in a post-conflict environment. The security forces must reflect the nature of security tasks to be conducted. Further, as the CJTF considers the force necessary for elections, the CJTF should analyze some additional tasks. FM 3-07.31 discusses some of the tasks that the CJTF should consider: area security, route security, security of ballots and counting houses, focusing on hotspots, and providing protection for designated host nation and international personnel. However this is not enough for the complexities in the security environment.<sup>62</sup> The CJTF should add the following to the list of security considerations:

- ♦ **Stability of the political party structure.** Can the political parties act responsibly during the debating process to not take up arms or create a violent situation? If the political parties created are a transition from warring elements, the combat force must be present during its transition.
- ♦ **Information Security.** There will be a requirement to secure information about electoral commissions, political parties and key institutions which may be used by adversaries to discredit the elections. Examples of this are locations of family members, locations of strategic meetings, operations orders for security, etc. In most operations, the CJTF can secure its own information, as it would be concerned with its own information security. However, in a post-conflict election, the CJTF may have to share sensitive information with other electoral entities. This exchange of information increases the information security vulnerabilities of ALL elements involved in the elections.
- ♦ **Secure critical infrastructure.** The possibility of an attack against infrastructure that has meaning to the citizens or political parties will be critical. Essential services may be tampered with in order to discredit the interim government's ability to maintain

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<sup>62</sup>United States Army, *Field Manual FM 3-07.31 Peace Ops, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations*", Chapter VI, paragraph 5.

security and discourage citizens to participate in the elections. This also includes information nodes, such as TV and radio stations.

The CJTF and its forces cannot secure everything, everywhere and at all times. The CJTF must carefully employ organic assets and integrate any available host nation and international community assets to maximize security. At every level, local, regional and national there are elements of security that are best suited for electoral security. At the local level, police and paramilitary forces play a key role in providing electoral security. There is a historical correlation between the number of police present and the casualties that occur as a result of elections. In post-conflict elections, the presence of a UN police force has influenced the violence and instability of the development of the democratic process. In Kosovo, there has been at least one UN police officer per 1000 inhabitants during every election held so far, but in Iraq and Afghanistan there have been none.<sup>63</sup> There were minimal casualties in Kosovo during the elections in 2000 and 2002 (the initial elections considered as post-conflict elections), while the same cannot be said for Iraq for the first two elections conducted. In the Iraq case, a security force specifically trained to handle elections, like UNCIVPOL, did not exist. While there were minimal casualties during the Election Day, the months prior to the January 2005 elections were the highest casualty numbers of the entire post-conflict period. The capability of a trained force that solely focuses on elections and electoral security cannot be underestimated.

At the regional level and at the national level, combinations of CJTF and host nation security forces have proven to be most successful in providing security during the elections period. During the elections in Afghanistan, CJTF-76, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), were both augmented with forces, the CJTF with one Infantry battalion and ISAF with 9,000 additional Soldiers based on the security assessment. Additionally, the CJTF had trained over 15,000 Afghans as part of the national police, who took part in local and regional

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<sup>63</sup> Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*, pg. 231.

security throughout the election period.<sup>64</sup> The result was a relatively calm election with minor attacks. The analysis of the international crisis group attributes the success of the ‘relatively’ safe elections to the overestimation of the threat and pro-active security measures.<sup>65</sup>

In summary, security is more than ensuring a citizen may drive safely to and from the ballot box and vote. The ability for candidates to conduct debates and share their ideas and political positions is also a significant security accomplishment. The main challenges for the CJTF in security during elections are the ability to transition threat elements into security forces or into the political environment the host nation, integrating the security forces capabilities to maximize security of critical personnel and infrastructure. Without security, the elections may not help achieve the goals necessary to help transition the host nation government to a representative body of its populace. Lack of security could be detrimental to the execution of the election and hinder all other components necessary for a successful election.

#### ***Economic Support for Elections<sup>66</sup>***

Economic support for the elections is part of ‘the foundations for elections’ due to the impacts that financial aspects have on elections. Economic support is defined as all monetary functions necessary to fund an election during post-conflict operations. Central to economic support is the political parties, as their campaigning will require economic support to carry out the values of the party in the governmental system. The CJTF primary focus should be on the financial actions of political parties as they prepare for and after elections. Secondary focus for the CJTF should be on all operational level actions where exchange of funding occurs between political parties, electoral employees and any international organizations providing grants. The

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<sup>64</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections*, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC., 8 April 2005, pg. 4.

International Crisis Group, *Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections*”, Asia Report No 88, Prepared in Kabul and Brussels, 23 November 2004, pg. 6.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. pg. 9-10.

<sup>66</sup> Economic support may also be referred as Political / Electoral Finance – all monetary functions necessary to fund an election during post-conflict operations.

CJTF can gain information on funding transactions through disclosure of financial transactions of political parties or getting information on the elections plan from the electoral commission. An electoral commission oversight council conducts financial activity oversight. The council observes and inspects for accountability of political parties earning and expenses, corruption practices and funds exchange from donors to electoral commissions and political parties.<sup>67</sup> If successful security is the cornerstone to be able to execute elections safely, successful economic support is the cornerstone to ensure that the elections are resourced properly. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the importance of political parties and the operational financial activities that the electoral commission provides.

In most countries, parliamentary elections are centered on individual candidates; in others, elections are controlled by political parties.<sup>68</sup> During post-conflict operations, as the international community involves itself into developing host nation governance, an electoral system will be devised. There has been no democracy in the last two hundred years that did not involve political parties.<sup>69</sup> Political parties must have the necessary funding to be able to deliver their message and participate in the electoral system. Regulations vary in each post-conflict operation on how political parties will be funded. However, political parties are predominately funded in two ways:

- ♦ **Direct funding.** Funding provided directly to the political party in some form of currency. In post-conflict elections, it is preferred that the funding is provided by an international donor or the host nation interim government. In this way, any additional funding provided may be considered illegal and be analyzed to the source.<sup>70</sup> Providing direct funding can level the playing field for all political parties to be involved.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> When discussing donors, we refer to any governmental agency or non-governmental agency that provides funding - examples of this are a host nation funding for political parties, the UN funding delivered to a elections committee to fund electoral workers, and organizations, private or public, who provide funding to political parties.

<sup>68</sup> Reginald Austin and Mark Tjernstrom, *Funding for Political Parties and Election Campaigns*, International Institute For Democracy And Electoral Assistance, Trydells AB, Sweden, 2003, pg. 2

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, pg. 6.

<sup>70</sup> See Ibid, pg. 209 for examples of countries that have direct funding practices

<sup>71</sup> Jeff Fisher, Marcin Walecki, and Jeffrey Carlson, eds. *Political Finance in Post-Conflict Societies*, pg. 19.

♦ **Indirect funding.** These are exceptions provided to the political parties so that the cost of the electoral process is minimized. Examples are tax exceptions, free media coverage etc.<sup>72</sup> In post-conflict, these are very effective ways to facilitate the political party involvement in the electoral process without excessive cost. Additionally, this also allows for the interim host nation government to show signs of support for the electoral process without spending additional funding.<sup>73</sup>

In a post-conflict society, given the environment of instability, lack of meaningful elections regulations initially and lack of political infrastructure, can lead to an environment of mistrust, unfairness and possible corruption.<sup>74</sup> The CJTF will have interest in any corruption in political parties, as most may be initiated by threat elements not interested in supporting the electoral process.

In most post-conflict elections, electoral commission oversight is the mechanism that will verify that international and host nation government funding for elections happens appropriately. The electoral commission is developed by either an international organization that is responsible for overseeing the elections (such as the UN) or the interim host nation government if it has the capabilities and authorities to do so (as the JEMB in Afghanistan). The electoral commission will be responsible for overseeing the overall financing of the elections. They will normally be responsible for ensuring that political parties are honest in all their financial transactions, hiring and paying for the elections workers, and purchasing items necessary to run the elections.

The electoral commission will have numerous financial challenges during post-conflict operations in which the CJTF can help. Some of these challenges are corruption, international involvement, timing of elections, relatively lack of political and electoral infrastructure, and the weak commitment to democratic principles and standards.<sup>75</sup> Most of these challenges the electoral commission can prosecute actions if they are provided the authority by the host nation or international organization responsible for the elections with cooperation by the CJTF. USAID

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<sup>72</sup> Reginald Austin, pg. 220 provides additional examples.

<sup>73</sup> Jeff Fisher, pg. 20.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, pg. 7.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, pg. 5.

provides a framework that the CJTF can use when assessing the economic support to the electoral process as comparing this framework to the current post-conflict operation that center around the following areas:<sup>76</sup>

- ◆ Gather and assess information - examine the financial situation for the electoral process.
- ◆ Recognize that effective political finance is a priority and define the role of such as system, if it has not already been developed.
- ◆ Educate all political groups - international organizations or electoral commission will normally have the lead.
- ◆ Seize assets of parties or individuals that previously controlled a country's illegitimate regime and abused state resources.
- ◆ Engage political entities, the media, and the public.
- ◆ Introduce a political finance system and initiate the development of political finance regulator - if it has not been already done by the host nation or international community).
- ◆ Provide limited direct and /or in-kind subsidies to political parties. This is a task performed by the host nation or international community.
- ◆ Support the media, civil society and the international community to monitor the political finance system – the CJTF can fully support with Information Operations or Public Affairs assets.
- ◆ Document and enforce violations of the law within the constraints of the post- conflict environment
- ◆ Evaluate the political finance system after reforms – This is normally conducted during the post election period, as political parties will prepare for follow-on elections or the host nation wishes to maintain key political entities in between election periods.
- ◆ Implement ‘exit strategy’ and support transfer of ownership of political finance system to local authorities – This action should be conducted when there was oversight to the electoral commission.

In summary, the funding, and the system in which elections are funded, is often overlooked by the CJTF and assumed that it will just happen. The economic support for the elections centers on the ability of political parties to finance their campaigning legally, and the elections commission’s ability to manage and distribute funding to political parties (those employed during the elections and purchasing the necessary items for the elections without corruption). The CJTF involvement should ensure that if corruption is identified, its security

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid, pgs. 126-129.

capabilities act to legitimize the electoral process, which will encourage the citizens to be involved and vote. The international community has a significant role in ensuring that the funding for elections is provided and accounted for. Overlooking or delaying economic support for elections results in poorly informed citizens, ill-prepared election workers; mis-prepared or delayed ballots, and corrupt actions by political parties in an effort to raise funds.<sup>77</sup>

## **PILLARS FOR ELECTIONS**

Electoral Administration, Public Information Program, Logistical Preparation, and Ethical Development are the integral components to ensure that the elections are effective and provide a sustainable democratic process in post-conflict environment. The ‘pillars’ for the elections are the elements that help the citizens in a post-conflict operation get involved in the political process and facilitate the key decision on how they will be represented.

### ***Electoral Administration***

‘Electoral administration’ embodies all the rules and regulations to execute the elections. To date, no CJTF has been directly involved in developing electoral administration for any nation during post-conflict operations. However, electoral administration has to be understood by leaders and staff in the CJTF, otherwise, the CJTF may fail to identify key tasks to be able to support the elections. No two electoral administrations are identical, and CJTFs should not assume that electoral administrative actions in one previous post-conflict operation would work in another. However, the CJTF can assess some the contextual factors of the electoral administration to have an understanding if the host nation has a feasible written plan for the elections. The CJTF needs to focus on all electoral law documentation that defines:

- ◆ the electoral system to be used,
- ◆ the creation or implementation of a electoral commission,

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<sup>77</sup> Author’s observations on the preparation and execution of Iraq national elections on 30 January 2005.

- ◆ duties, and responsibilities for all entities involved; these entail: voter registration procedures, political party registration procedures, funding procedures and complaint procedures.

Further, the CJTF should get an overview of memorandums of agreement and understanding that the host nation may have with non-governmental organizations, international organizations or other members involved in the elections.

Electoral law can exist in a post-conflict environment in a variety of forms. It is defined by the convening authority in the host nation during post-conflict operations.<sup>78</sup> In most cases where the United Nations is involved, there will be regulations provided through a UN resolution or regulation. For example, UN Regulation No. 2004/12 for Kosovo defines how the electoral assembly will be selected. When the host nation interim government has the authority to provide law, they will design the electoral law construct. The JEMB design by President Karzai in 2003 defines an example of the host nation interim governance providing the rules for elections.<sup>79</sup>

Lastly, there have been examples where an occupying entity provides the electoral law guidance. An example of this is the development of the Transitional Administrative Law by the Coalition Provincial Authority in Iraq to set standards for the execution of elections.<sup>80</sup>

The description of an electoral system is one of the primary requirements of that electoral law. During post-conflict operations, the most common forms of electoral systems are First Past Post, Proportional Representation, Alternative Vote System, and The Single Transferable Vote. The following are some of the advantages and disadvantages to these system of importance to the CJTF:<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Peacekeeping Practices Unit, *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, 2003, p 152.

<sup>79</sup> Joint Elections Management Body, *2004 Afghanistan Presidential Election Operational Outline*, acquired from Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 22 July 2004, p10.

<sup>80</sup> Coalition Provincial Authority. *Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period*, signed 8 March 2004, found on website <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html>, downloaded 14 August 2006, Article 30-32.

<sup>81</sup> Colin Roth and Anna Wilde eds. *Elections and the Electoral Process: A Guide to Assistance*, Governance Department, Deparment for International Development, UN Department Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2003, annex A.

**First Past Post** – The candidate(s) in each electoral district or at the national level who gets the most votes is/are elected by party selection, regardless of the share of the total votes collected.

Advantages for the CJTF:

- ◆ Easy to understand for the citizens and for the CJTF staff.
- ◆ Can help one political party maintain or gain power, the CJTF will only have to strategically coordinate with less organizations

Disadvantages for the CJTF:

- ◆ In an election with many political parties participating, it is likely that the one selected may not represent the majority of the citizens. The CJTF may have to increase security posture.
- ◆ Those who voted for a losing party, will not be represented politically. The CJTF may find itself having to increase the security posture initially.

**Proportional Representation** – Candidates of political parties are elected in proportion to the number of votes their party or party candidates, receive out of the total number of votes cast in a single election. There are some variations of the proportional representation, but they provide the same type of effect to the host nation.

Advantages for the CJTF:

- ◆ Each vote will count. The CJTF can assess that the votes will be fully representative of the government selected. (There are some versions of proportional representation system where a minimum percentage of votes are required for a candidate or party to gain a seat).
- ◆ Easier for the CJTF to pass public information that the citizens will be represented by a government of their choice.

Disadvantages for the CJTF:

- ◆ Difficult to count, chances for corruption and illegitimate practices during the election may be high.
- ◆ The CJTF will end up at the strategic level having to be involved with numerous political parties.

**Alternate Vote System** – political parties or candidates are listed and voters provide a preference by ranking from most desired to least desired the candidate of choice (1 to x, x being the total number of candidates). If a candidate or party has the majority of the preferences, the party wins. If there is no political party or candidate with the majority of votes, then the one with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated and that candidate or party votes are re-allocated among the other political parties or candidates. This process continues until the majority of votes to one political party or candidate occurs. (There is also a similar system called Single Transferable Vote that is not often used in post-conflict operations).

Advantages for the CJTF:

- ◆ Whoever is elected has majority support - easier for the CJTF to pass public information that the citizens will be represented by a government of their choice.

Disadvantages for the CJTF:

- ◆ Very difficult to understand for host nations in post-conflict operations – requires a mass public information campaign.
- ◆ The CJTF will have to conduct security for longer periods, as the political party campaigning will have to reach to all populace for clear understanding.
- ◆ Like First Past Post System, the winning party may not necessarily have the majority of primary votes.

**Additional Member System** – In this system, a proportion of the parliament or legislating body is elected by a list system and remainder directly on a district representative system. What this means is that each vote for the local candidates across all constituencies is totaled according to their party and additional seats are allocated from the party's regional or national list according to the proportion of the total votes cast.

Advantages for the CJTF:

- ◆ Those elected will represent the votes cast - Easier for the CJTF to pass public information that the citizens will be represented by a government of their choice.
- ◆ Allows for a system where the CJTF can work in a decentralized matter, when the provinces of the host nation have more political power than the national level government.

Disadvantages for the CJTF:

- ◆ Difficult to understand for host nations in post-conflict operations – requires a mass public information campaign. This requires a decentralized plan for support by the CJTF as citizens essentially have two votes, one for their local representative and one for the party list.

Electoral commissions will be empowered by either the constitution of the host nation with additional duties as defined by the electoral law or by an international resolution that empowers the creation and authority of one. The electoral commission will be responsible for ensuring that the electoral system is followed and that the complaints are addressed. There are normally three electoral commission models.<sup>82</sup> One model is to assign primary responsibility to a government ministry. In post-conflict operations, this model will be unlikely to be used as the ministries in the government may be overwhelmed with their own required actions. The second is to provide judiciary or selected judges the responsibility to execute the commission. This may not be favorable to the CJTF since the judiciary system may be in its infancy and not prepared to handle the technical portions of an election. They may also be influenced by political entities

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<sup>82</sup> David Hirshmann, *Managing Democratic Electoral Assistance, A Practical Guide for USAID*, The Center For Democracy and Governance, United States Agency for International Development, Washington DC. May 1995, 14.

through money or threats, and the security requirements for these known Figures will be significant. The third system and most advantageous for the CJTF is based on a consensus of the interim government, political parties and international organizations involved to select qualified individuals (from the host nation preferably) to manage the elections. In this model, the qualified personnel have no governmental attachment and can ensure that the policies are adhered to with no major complaints from all involved. No matter what model is chosen, the CJTF should have some coordination with the electoral commission representatives at every level, to gain information on the elections progress.

The electoral law must be clear about the duties and responsibilities of all entities involved. The CJTF should assess the host nation's electoral law; at a minimum research voter registration procedures, political party registration procedures, funding procedures, complaint, and appeals procedures. If these minimum requirements are not met and enforced, the CJTF will be responsible for the security fall out, corruption practices and instability. The CJTF can refer to electoral law framework from USAID, the UN or International Organizations (IO) that work on electoral systems to compare and analyze some of the challenges the host nation may have in post-conflict operations.<sup>83</sup>

### ***Public Information Program***

Voter education is key to the success of the election. The military contingent is likely to play a central role in publicizing the elections, explaining who is eligible to vote and how, where and when to vote. Leaflets, newspapers, local radio and TV, the internet, personal meetings, or a combination of all may do this. The international electoral commission will have the lead but the military must closely coordinate. The military personnel must also act in an impartial manner.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Some references for CJTF to consider are United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's) *Governance in Post-conflict Situations: Electoral Systems and Processes*, Chapter 3, May 2004; Blanc, Hyllan and Volland's *State Structure and Electoral Systems in Post-conflict Situation*, July 2006; and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, 2003. All references are fully listed in the Bibliography of this document.

<sup>84</sup> United States Army, Chapter VI, pg. VI-6.

An election's public information program contain all information related actions to ensure that leaders of political parties have a platform to discuss issues, citizens gain understanding of the election system, and feedback can be gained on the success and failure of the electoral process. Through public information, the CJTF as well as other organizations will educate and influence the public to the decision that they will make. The importance of the right messages at the right time to all the citizens cannot be over emphasized, as is clearly portrayed in the above quote from FM 3-07.31. However, the quote provided in the field manual does not adequately address what the CJTF needs to understand about public information. To discuss public information for elections in post-conflict operations, three major areas of interest to the CJTF merit further analysis.

The first is that during an election period, the CJTF must understand the media environment, and the policies that shape it. The second is the CJTF and the public information domains of educating the voters and political issues. Voter education and discussion of political issues are both necessary and important, but they must be appropriated the sufficient time and effort. The third is the CJTF role in understanding some of the major violations that can occur as a result of public information during post-conflict elections and what the CJTF can do about them.<sup>85</sup> Although the CJTF will have some direct responsibility to support the public information campaign for the elections, it is not the lead element. The host nation, with its electoral commission and the assistance of Non-Governmental (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs), should provide the public information plan for the election. Thus, this thesis will not cover all the aspects of the public information domain for the elections, just those areas that are important to the CJTF.

The media environment during the electoral process in post-conflict operations can be volatile, uncertain, ambiguous and complex. During the elections, there will be information

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<sup>85</sup> Some examples of major violations are media corruption, hate message and denying access to information. These will be further defined in this section.

provided by the electoral commission and organizations that explain the concept of elections. In the same environment, there will be actors, internal and external to the host nation whose opinions will attempt to influence the concept of the elections, attempt to dissuade the populace from getting involved or provide false rhetoric to the elections. Additionally, within this environment, regulations established by the host nation that generally support the democratic values of freedom of speech and expression, fair and equal opportunity for parties to compete through political debate.<sup>86</sup> Further, the media agencies will be directed to provide education to voters on their rights, reporting on the development of the election campaign, providing a platform for the political parties to communicate their message to the electorate, and eventually reporting accurate results.<sup>87</sup> Between regulations, the media agencies, the host nation government, political parties and those actors who wish to disrupt the elections, there are a magnitude of messages and information that can inundate the populace if not managed or observed properly. The role of the CJTF within the media environment information is to reinforce the messages of fair and impartial elections, provide simplicity in understanding the electoral process, set realistic expectations for the public with respect to elections, and when violations occur, assist the host nation in taking immediate action.

The second area of interest to the CJTF is developing and supporting the public information plan to educate the voters and political party issues. The CJTF must take an active role, regardless on who is the lead for public information in the elections:

- ◆ to ensure that the voters are informed of what type of election it will be (local, regional, referendum, etc),
- ◆ to disseminate the time and location for the elections,
- ◆ to support actions that voters and political parties need to register,
- ◆ in addition, be able to educate citizens about their freedoms of speech and expression.

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<sup>86</sup> European Commission for Democracy through Law, *Guidelines on Media Analysis During Election Observation Missions*, Council for Democratic Elections and the Venice Commission, Strasbourg, France. 21-22 October 2005, pg. 5.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, pg. 14.

An additional reason why the CJTF must be active in education of voters is that as the CJTF provides mechanisms to ensure these messages are delivered; they also assist in the ethical development necessary of voters during elections. Discussion of the ethical development will be in the next section of this chapter. The CJTF educates voters through delivering posters, word of mouth, and using public affairs and psychological operations units to pass the education message to citizens. The CJTF also has the capability to reach areas to educate where host nation, NGOs, and IO cannot reach. For example, the remoteness of the villages, and lack of formal means of communication in Afghanistan forced the UN electoral mission (the JEMB) to get assistance from CJTF-76 and coalition forces to visit in person from village to village passing information about the elections.<sup>88</sup> Public information also requires feedback as simply delivering messages and information to the voters is not enough. In most cases, there will be polls conducted by media agents to find out if the information is getting to the voters. In Afghanistan example, the information was received, as signified by the voter registration and turn out, 10.5 million voters registered of which 8 million voted.<sup>89</sup>

Public information in reference to political issues as presented by the media, political parties and the host nation (where applicable) are a challenge for the CJTF to support and ensure that accurate and unbiased information is provided to the voters. During post-conflict elections, the host nation may be conducting its first democratic form of elections. The political parties, the host nation and the media will be challenged on what information is relevant for the voters to make decisions at the polls. Further, the control of media outlets by political entities may be used to adversely influence the elections. Electoral commissions, NGOS and IOs should focus their efforts to observe:

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<sup>88</sup> Cliff Orloff and Olga Shalygin, *Afghanistan a fragile peace / a documentary film*. Red Door Video Productions, 2004.

<sup>89</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution and Government*, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC., 25 May 2006, pg. 4.

- ◆ **Actions by the interim or incumbent government.** At time the interim or incumbent government takes advantage of his position to influence the elections and deny opportunities for other candidates to express their views.<sup>90</sup>
- ◆ **Media outlets.** Some media outlets, by virtue of being private and interested in profit rather than the information provided by political entities, may alter or deny view points by political parties to be presented to voters. Therefore, some NGOs observe TV, Radio and internet media outlets for any significant patterns of this behavior.<sup>91</sup>

Ideally, the CJTF in conjunction with NGOs and IOs can monitor media, the messages from political parties, public, private and government media sources to ensure that messages are not undermining the democratic process or violations occur.<sup>92</sup> In the event that no NGOs or IOs are available, the CJTF will have to conduct an analysis to determine how to best monitor the elections in conjunction with the host nation government. Additional memorandums of agreement may have to be developed in order to agree on the training of media when covering political issues, monitoring media during the electoral process and defining the authority of the CJTF when monitoring the media coverage of elections.

The third area interest for the CJTF to understand concerns the major violations or errors that can occur within the public information domain. The local elections in Cambodia of 2002, which were the first in 30 years after a civil war that ended in 1991 and two questionable national elections in 1993 and 1998, provide examples of some of these types of violations and errors. Example of major violations or errors that can occur in the public information pillar of interest to the CJTF are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

- ◆ **Undue influence by the incumbent or interim government to control media.** This issue was discussed in the previous area of interest. While mentioning that the NGOs and IOs will monitor, the CJTF has a responsibility to take actions by reprimand and/or removal of the interim government officials. In some cases, the influence by the government may not be direct and the CJTF must be aware to prepare for that. The 2002 elections in Cambodia, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) conducted over 200 acts of intimidation and some believe to have concealed the murders of many political

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<sup>90</sup> European Commission for Democracy through Law, *Guidelines on Media Analysis During Election Observation Missions*, pg. 45.

<sup>91</sup> Robert Norris, and Patrick Merloe, pg. 7-9.

<sup>92</sup> Inspired from Brandt, Torben; Howard, Ross; Real Barnabe and others, *Coaching Manual for Support to Media During Elections*, July 2006.

party competitors to influence the result of the elections.<sup>93</sup> While in this scenario there was no CJTF present, the lack of action by the interim authority to ensure that the violations were addressed and those involved in the government were reprimanded further hurt the ability of the voters to be a part of a legitimate election.

- ♦ **Denying access to information.** In this event, the political parties or the interim government may deny the media, the voters and the CJTF access to information. The elections in Cambodia also provide insight to examples by a interim electorate government to control and deny access to information. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) conducted all training necessary for the host nation media to gather and present information for the elections. However, the host nation government designed no rules for the media during the electoral period, which hindered the ability for the media to gain access to elections. The CPP took control of the electronic media during the period prior to these elections by withholding all licenses to operate to all of its opponents.<sup>94</sup> Further, this censorship also prevents the international community from influencing or supporting the flow of public information necessary for the elections.
- ♦ **Media corruption.** As a result of media wanting to make profit or if coerced by a political party, the media may abstain from providing equal time and quality of information to political parties or political issues. In the Cambodia example, because of the lack of electoral law for the media to be followed, the media was dependent on political party funding. Most political parties in Cambodia control one form of print and radio media while CPP maintained control of the TV and electronic media.<sup>95</sup>
- ♦ **Hate messages.** During this volatile time in post-conflict environment, the political parties may still have messages of hate regarding another political party, ethnic or religious group. The use of these messages may incite violence among the political parties, the government and the voters. Of all the areas of major violations, this is the most significant to the CJTF to be able to control and identify. Because of our information age, even in post-conflict environment, hate messages may be delivered and acknowledged by other groups in a faster time than the CJTF's capability to acknowledge the message and respond. In the Cambodia example, there were no hate messages noted by any of the reports. However, the acts of intimidations performed throughout the elections period by what is believed to be the CPP, may have deferred the other political parties to not make any negative or hate messages.<sup>96</sup>

At a minimum, the CJTF must maintain awareness of electoral law with respect to media, ethical issues within the framework of the electoral process and cooperation with NGOs and IOs

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<sup>93</sup> Human Rights Briefing Paper, *Cambodia's Commune Elections: Setting the Stage for the 2003 National Elections*, downloaded from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/cambo0402/cambo0402.pdf> on 10 December 2006, Human Rights Watch – Asia Division, 4 August 2004, pg. 4.

<sup>94</sup> Monroe Price, *Restructuring the Media in Post-conflict Societies: Four Perspectives – The Experience of Intergovernmental and Non-Governmental Organizations*, A background paper for the UNESCO World Press Day Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, May 2000, pg. 22.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, pg. 22

<sup>96</sup> Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia, *Cambodian Commune Council Election Report 2001-2002*, NIFEC, Phom Penh, Cambodia, July 2002, pg. 10-11.

if they are involved. The public information pillar will require the attention of the CJTF throughout the election process and the CJTF should appropriate assets and analysis accordingly.

### ***Logistic Preparation***

Logistical Preparation for elections are the actions taken to get physical materials, personnel and infrastructure necessary to execute elections. This includes the printing of ballots, transportation of elections officials to the polling sites, and local contracting performed. A centralized logistical concept for elections must be developed and synchronized with support of security agencies and government / oversight officials. The timeliness and efficiency of logistical support can deter from the legitimacy of the elections. One of the most successful organizations that systematically addresses and executes the logistical preparation of elections is the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) in Kosovo. Since 2000, OSCE has provided the logistical process to bring together international organizations, military organizations, and local governance to execute elections. The effectiveness by OSCE throughout the years has allowed for transitioning the logistical support of the elections to the Kosovo government and local officials.<sup>97</sup>

Similar to the earlier discussion of security tasks, logistics is an area where the CJTF is familiar to support and execute, but the CJTF must approach the actions within logistic support carefully. In this monograph, there have been some examples of logistical support actions performed by CJTF (such as BiH, and Afghanistan). However, the scope and level of involvement in logistic preparation by the CJTF may affect resources available to execute security tasks. The CJTF must understand several factors when performing logistical preparation for elections in post-conflict elections. The first is determining as soon as possible the statute that governs how the CJTF will logically support the elections. The second is that the number of resources from the CJTF that will be used with respect to the elections cannot affect the resources

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<sup>97</sup> Information was gathered from multiples in the OSCE Mission in Kosovo website, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13208.html>, viewed 1 October 2006.

necessary to do security tasks. The last factor and most important is that of synchronizing the logistical effort and personnel involved in the elections.

The statutes or policies that govern how the CJTF will logically support the elections are normally arranged at the COCOM or senior CJTF level with the host nation electoral commission. In the event that there is no electoral commission, the COCOM or senior CJTF will create partnerships through arrangements with the UN, OSCE or any other NGO and IOs responsible for the elections. In the January 2005 elections in Iraq, the CJTF at all levels conducted logistical assessments for the elections in their particular region. The agreements on logistical support were conducted at the CJTF through verbal agreement with the International Electoral Commission Iraq (IEC-I), but there was no logistic agreement signed. The CJTF (Multinational Forces Iraq, or MNF-I) provided the logistical coordination requirements permeated to the subordinate units through the orders process. All equipment, fuel and any other logistical support actions that were identified and executed by the subordinate units were submitted to MNF-I. These expenses were then listed to IEC-I who would conduct payment through the UN as a primary donor. This proved a challenge, as IEC-I interpretation of logistical support requirements was not necessarily in agreement with that of MNF-I subordinate units' interpretation. Because of the lack of understanding, MNF-I subordinate leaders were involved in logistical support beyond that of the normal military logistic capabilities. In one instance currency had to be delivered to facilitate payment for logistical support, as the CJTF could not provide direct currency to the electoral commission. On 15 January 2005, there was the delivery of \$1.3 million in cash directly to the provincial IEC-I director to assist him in payment for salaries for those involved in working the elections.<sup>98</sup> The currency only created additional requirements to the CJTF that they may have not been prepared for, such as where to store the

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<sup>98</sup> The reference on this was from the author's personal experience when coordinating the election effort in the Salah Ad Din Province from November 2004 through January 2005.

money and how to best control payment for election workers and accountability of purchases made.

The CJTFs second logistical factor to assess and understand is the number of resources from the CJTF that will be used with respect to the elections. If the CJTF is involved in conducting logistical support during elections, it may require that additional assets, personnel or funding be requested in advance. This may seem insignificant because the Joint Operation Planning Process may help define the logistical requirements, however, the timing to get the additional costs and personnel may bring unnecessary stress to the CJTF to execute. An example of this was the increase of forces required by NATO to execute the BiH municipal elections in 1997.<sup>99</sup> During these post-conflict operations, as a result of the success of logistical support tasks previously in Chapter I, the request by NATO to the United States for additional forces to support SFOR was sent six months prior. The US provided the additional forces by delaying the departure of the outgoing unit in order to have the necessary forces for the elections. The result of this increase logically (internal to the US) was \$161 million that the DoD and Congress had not planned for.<sup>100</sup> Although the SFOR contingent was smaller than the IFOR contingent was, this CJTF was still involved significantly in logistical and election support operations beyond those of security tasks.<sup>101</sup>

The last factor for the CJTF to address if involved in the elections is defining who will synchronize the logistical effort and personnel involved in the elections and the capabilities of that organization to do so. If there is no overarching synchronizer for the logistical efforts of the elections, there is a possibility that efforts and funding may go to meet some requirements, while

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<sup>99</sup> US Government Accountability Office, *Bosnia – Cost Estimating Has Improved, but Operational Changes Will Affect Current Estimates*, GAO/NSIAD 97-183, Report to Congressional Committees, Washington DC, 28 July 1997, pg. 6.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, pg. 8.

<sup>101</sup> Center For Army Lessons Learned. *BiH National Elections, Tactics Techniques and Procedures Volume II*, Newsletter 98-19, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 1998, Ft Leavenworth, KS, pg. 32

others are not met. The CJTF seldom will participate alone in the logistical environment during the elections. In all elections that the CJTF has been involved in elections to date, only in Iraq's first elections was the CJTF the only element available and capable for synchronizing the logistic effort for the elections.<sup>102</sup> The security situation was unstable in some of the provinces to the extent that IEC-I was only able to bring in workers and coordinate logistics less than 60 days from the elections. If an electoral commission exists, it is likely that they will do everything possible to synchronize the election process. Through agreements, other governmental organizations will also provide support to the electoral commission to conduct logistical support. USAID provides an example of logistical support to the electoral commission in the January 2005 Iraqi Elections. USAID provided over \$40 million to an NGO to assist IEC-I, and agreed to a \$50 million ceiling with the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS) to assist with the personnel training and logistical requirements.<sup>103</sup>

While the CJTF can not control any of the logistical actors and their actions, they can identify the lead agent to ensure that all logistical support requirements are identified and supported. If logistical requirements are not met, it is very likely that the CJTF may be required to execute some of these tasks in a time-constricted environment. Therefore, the CJTF must ensure that there is a capable logistical synchronizer for the elections to prevent unnecessary logistical tasks.

#### ***Ethical Development<sup>104</sup>***

Ethical Development is the decisive element of all the key components in Figure 3 to determine the extent of success of elections in post-conflict operations. The ethical development

<sup>102</sup> M.E. Dunard, *Elections Support, A Summary of Lessons and Observations from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom*, Marine Corps Center For Lessons Learned, Quantico, VA, 3 October 2005 pgs. 11-13.

<sup>103</sup> United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Iraq Reconstruction Weekly Update*, [http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/updates/feb05/iraq\\_fs14\\_020305.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/updates/feb05/iraq_fs14_020305.pdf), Washington DC, 3 February 2005 (accessed 12 December 2006), pg. 10.

<sup>104</sup> Ethics – A set of moral principles, a theory of moral principles and values; the discipline dealing with what is good and bad; and with moral duty and obligation – Websters Online Dictionary, <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary> accessed 12 January 2007.

pillar refers to the moral principles that host nation leadership, political parties, and citizens must understand during the electoral process to develop a functional government that represents its citizens. In the context of this thesis, we will limit the ethical development in post-conflict operations discussion to three areas. The first is a discussion of the ethical environment during post-conflict elections, and who is responsible for ethical development. The second discussion is how the CJTF fits into the ethical development and what actions should the CJTF do to support the ethical development of the host nation. The third is a discussion of elections success because of ethical development and timing. Driven by strategic requirements to meet objectives within a campaign, elections will be constrained by a time requirement to be executed. The development of an ethical framework for the host nation should be accomplished prior to the start of the elections process in order to have the best chance for success. The CJTF may not have a direct role in influencing the timing of elections versus the ethical development of the host nation, but it does have to understand the consequences to the future of the government as a result of lack of ethical development prior to elections.

The host nation will likely face an unstable ethical environment during election period in a post-conflict scenario. It is during this period where the ethical development of elections can help to improve the overall host nation ethics. However, there are actors (friendly and adversarial) within the host nation and within the government that will resist the change in moral development to execute elections. In most cases, these actors will attempt to maintain the moral principles that the host nation had before the conflict, which may not be in the best interests of assisting the development of a representative form of government. The moral principles that support elections must then provide the framework in which the ethics of the society will be associated with during its stability and reconstruction. When discussing the ethical environment for elections, one must define what the moral principles should focus on and who is responsible for defining and implementing moral principles for elections.

Staffan Lindberg's study of elections in post-conflict operations in Africa provided a framework for ethical development for election periods in post-conflict operations that is worthy of consideration. He studied the ethical values that democracies have during multiple iterations of elections and how over time, the countries in Africa had a significant improvement in democratic development.<sup>105</sup> While his study is mainly centered on developing democracies, he makes an argument for the moral principles necessary for free and fair elections.<sup>106</sup> The moral principles for elections according to Lindberg should be centered on political participation, competition within the system and legitimacy.<sup>107</sup> In other words, when developing the rules for post-conflict elections, the rules should address something in political participation, competition within the system and legitimacy.

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<sup>105</sup> Staffan Lindberg, *Democracy and Elections In Africa*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006, pgs. 1-8.

<sup>106</sup> In his book, Lindberg defines what this thesis considers as areas to focus moral principles into as "qualities to democracy".

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, pgs. 37-45.




Figure 4 – Ethical Development Impact to Post-Conflict Elections

In the context of the Figure 4, when all the rules of the key components of post-conflict operations are developed and implemented in a way that facilitates political participation, competition and legitimacy within the system, then the possibility of a successful election increases. Political participation is the ability to get voters and political parties to participate in the elections. Lindberg implies that the host nation's ability to have political participation as the ability of the host nation to have self-rule, be sovereign.<sup>108</sup> In order to achieve political participation, the moral principles must take into consideration of the cultural traits of the host nation. If we were using the key considerations in Figure 4, an example of moral principles for gain political participation may be a public information campaign informs the citizens of their rights to vote, how to register, and the opinions of the political parties.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, pg. 30.

Legitimacy focuses on all the rules, observations, inspections and verifications necessary to ensure that corruption or cheating does not occur. Lindberg states in his research that the host nation has the possibility to continue to exist in its accepted form of government if legitimate elections are conducted.<sup>109</sup> In the context of Figure 4, an example of legitimacy may be regulations defining financial disclosure of political party funding within economic support. If political parties were to disclose expenditures and accept penalties for mistakes, then this action may be considered as an improvement in ethical development.

Competition within the system is the ability of the political parties and constituents to conduct dialogue of the political issues concerning the host nation, without resorting to violence, corruption or any actions that undermine the electoral law. Lindberg further defines this quality as the accountability and responsiveness of political parties to the host nation's needs and issues<sup>110</sup> An example of competition within the system with respect to Figure 4 is the change of political seats from one political party to another political party as a result of the public information campaign.

The host nation interim government (or international interim government, whichever is in charge) is ultimately responsible for the moral principles that support the areas of political participation, legitimacy and competition within the system for elections in post-conflict operations. The host nation should conduct actions within the pillars as defined in Figures 3 and 4, to ensure that there is ethical development of the host nation. NGOs and research organizations have models designed which can help the host nation interim government with the development of these moral principles.<sup>111</sup> However, if the interim government works on ethical

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid, pg. 43.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, pg. 39.

<sup>111</sup> Lindberg provided the areas where moral principles that an interim government should focus on, however, it does not provide a full listing of all moral principles to consider. While the scope of this thesis is not to define all the moral principles to consider, the following references provide excellent frameworks to research a variety of moral principles to elections:

- Zemanovicova, Sicakova and Beblavy's *Building an Anticorruption Strategy*; Footnote Continues in the following page.

development for elections, we assume that that the interim government has to understand the moral principles necessary for a representative form of government, and that it develops those principles within the limits of what the culture can tolerate.

The second point of this discussion is the role of the CJTF in the ethical development of the host nation during elections. The role for the CJTF in ethical development is dependent upon the host nation's capability to understand and enforce all moral principles and the availability of the international community to support the host nation. If the international community is present, the ethical values previously discussed apply; therefore, CJTF should maintain a supportive role by relating the moral principles of elections to all levels of host nation leadership. Additionally, the CJTF can set the example when necessary to assist in host nation development when necessary.

If there is insufficient support from the international community, it is imperative that the CJTF takes a lead role with the host nation to ensure that the moral principles of the elections are understood and implemented. In this case, the CJTF has to carefully monitor the ethical development of the host nation carefully, before determining how much direct involvement the CJTF will have. The CJTF should develop metrics to measure the ethical development of the host nation because of the elections. Some examples of such are: actions of discrimination, violations in voter and political party registration, electoral legislation present, violations to access to media, and lack of reporting and disclosure requirements met by political parties and the host nation.<sup>112</sup> The primary reason why CJTF has to monitor and quantify the ethical development is that the result of a failed ethical development in the host nation may lead political

- Blanc, Hyllan and Volland's *State Structure and Electoral Systems in Post-Conflict Situations*;  
 - ODIHR's (OSCE) *Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections*; and  
 - National Democratic Institute's *Legislative Ethics: A Comparative Analysis*.

<sup>112</sup> Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, *Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections*, downloaded 10 January 2007 from Office of Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE) website <http://www.osce.org>, Warsaw, Poland, 2001, pgs. 9, 15, 18, 21, 27.

parties to quit the electoral process, and instead attempt to go to the methods such as corruption, instability and possibly violence, to settle their political issues. Although the CJTF will be able to make some sort of quantifiable analysis on the ethical development of the host nation, it will be a subjective decision by the CJTF commander as to whether take the lead in ethical development and how much the CJTF will get involved in doing so.

The last discussion point is elections success because of ethical development and timing of elections. Regardless of who is responsible for the ethical development in the host nation during elections, there are consequences to the government and the host nation if the ethical development does not occur in a timely manner prior to the elections. This is particularly important with the first elections. Depending on the culture and the other key components to elections in post-conflict operations, the first elections can be the most critical and the most difficult. Ethical development for elections is normally associated with democratic principles, which most western nations have some common experiences at one time or another. In post-conflict operations, the host nation that the CJTF will be involved with are not of the same cultural traits as the western societies. Therefore, if the CJTF is required to meet the US Government strategic objective to create a representative form of governance in a post-conflict environment, the CJTF must understand that failure of the host nation to achieve some form of ethical development may result in strategic failure of the mission. This achievement becomes even more difficult when the coalition partners in the CJTF are not of western societies. An example to consider is attempting to execute post conflict elections in Iraq with the coalition of Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991. The work for the CJTF would have been exponentially more difficult as non-western value coalition members may challenge and impede with the process of executing elections.

An analysis of all the post-conflict operations that the US (with a CJTF) and the UN have been involved in, the ethical development in a timely manner has played a key reason as to why

the representative form of government (or democratic) has not taken place.<sup>113</sup> John Dobbins, through the Rand Corporation has done significant studies on the actions by the US and the UN in nation building and describing some of the lessons learned. For the UN, their involvement in Congo failed because of the inability to implement a government that avoided corruption.<sup>114</sup> In the case of Cambodia, the lesson learned was that it requires a long time for democratization, and that culturally, the concept of democracy as a free form of representative government may not be understood. Haiti's elections in the 1990's proved that elections done quickly do not mean that a prospering democracy will take shape. In this case, elections required significant ethical development by those in power (Aristide) to better govern.<sup>115</sup> During operations in Somalia, elections never took place, UNITAF failed to coordinate an effort to build regional and national civil institutions throughout the country, which would require some sort of ethical development.<sup>116</sup> This was as a result of security and economic stability never taking shape in the first place. At the time of the writing of this thesis, it is not clear whether the ethical development for the host nations (which would include elections) has allowed for a successful representative form of government in Iraq and Afghanistan. With respect to these two countries, Dobbins implies that had the United States and the UN provided necessary reforms to the political and economic development (a reform being an adjustment of the moral policies) and applied timely, the United States may have been able manage some of the negative consequences.<sup>117</sup>

The conclusion about ethical development and timing of elections is that there is a correlation to the failure to having an emerging a democratic or representative form of government and the lack of ethical development. The CJTF must have an appreciation to the strategic consequences if the host nation fails to have ethical development prior to the elections.

<sup>113</sup> James Dobbins, Seth Jones and others, *UN Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Rand Corporation, Washington DC. 2005, Executive Summary pgs. 31-35.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, pg. 20.

<sup>115</sup> Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*, pg. 83-84.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, pg. 64-65.

<sup>117</sup> Dobbins, *UN Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, pg. 223.

If the CJTF can effectively analyze of the moral principles necessary for a successful election based on the cultural traits of the host nation, they can define the best way to influence the host nation at all levels to develop with the necessary values to meet the requirements for an elections. Lastly, the host nation and the CJTF will not be alone in this endeavor. While there may be actors that attempt to influence the moral direction of the host nation, there are also international organization and significant research documentation available to define the ethical values necessary for development.

## **VALIDATING FUNCTIONS**

### *Observer Plan for Elections*

The observer plan for elections is the primary function that validates an election. While the host nation government and the international community will spend time in ensuring that ethical development is happening in the host nation, the observer plays a ‘referee’ role during the planning and the execution of the elections. While an observer will have little or no responsibilities, they will have the capability to relay the results of the execution of the elections. The CJTF has an indirect role with the observer plan for the elections. The CJTF will focus on security and coordination measures to provide freedom of movement to observers. In the next paragraphs, we will provide background information on observer actions, the indirect roles of the CJTF, and some considerations for the CJTF when securing observers.

In the context of elections, there are varieties of observers. The UN categorizes their observers as domestic elections observers, electoral observers and technical assistance observers.<sup>118</sup> Domestic election observers provide observance for elections in a host nation that had a trend of democratic elections, like Mexico, in which the UN provide regional observers to look for trends or any major violations. Electoral and technical assistance observers refer to the type normally used in post-conflict operations. Electoral observers are international observers

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<sup>118</sup> Newman, E.; Rich, R. pgs. 173-176.

who will provide assessment in all aspects of the electoral campaign. While these observers will hire host nation personnel to help observe, they will not work for any host nation government organization. Normally, they will be present at the polling stations, provide detailed inspections on how the elections went, and then follow up with a thorough description of what happened. On the other hand, technical assistance observers will come to the host nation to train host nation personnel on observing elections. The observers for the elections are managed by the electoral body of the host nation. Technical assistance observers are best suited for post-conflict operations where the training of the observers provides some ethical development.

Almost every NGO that conducts election support has the capability to conduct electoral or technical observations at the request of the host nation. To request observer support, the host nation has to provide a needs assessment evaluation to the UN or NGO for support.<sup>119</sup> This means that the host nation has to be recognized as a sovereign nation, or the conflict be recognized through international channels first before any support can occur. In the International Oversight discussion, we will discuss in more detail about the international recognition required for oversight. The CJTF does not have any direct involvement with type of observation that will occur in the election, it is important that they understand the types of observers and what requirements may happen as a result. Additionally, the CJTF can analyze some aspect of the observations that will help understand the capabilities and success of observers.

The CJTF primary role with observers, regardless of type, is to provide security. However, the CJTF should make some unique considerations to providing security for observers during elections. Adversaries who are trying to denounce the electoral process will normally consider attacking observers.<sup>120</sup> The CJTF, in coordination with the UN or NGOs involved for the elections, will coordinate for security escort plan and area security as applicable. While this

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid, pg. 172.

<sup>120</sup> For examples of threats to elections observers and elections workers see, Ester Pan's, *Iraq: Organizing Elections*, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7763/iraq.html#13>, 25 January 2005.

may seem like a simple task for the CJTF, there are further considerations to this security. The first is that of not compromising the observers. Perception of the CJTF being too involved in the observer security may give the impression that the CJTF may be trying to coerce the election. The second is that of getting them to the appropriate locations at the right time. The observer team may lose credibility or may miss a key event in the process if the observer does not get to the appropriate location in a timely manner. Lastly, if the observers are not successful and secured, the CJTF may lack the ability to gain first hand reporting from observers. The observers will note trends from the host nation population that the CJTF would otherwise not notice.

### ***International Oversight***

International oversight is the ability of a unified coalition of non-military international organizations and foreign governments to provide support to the host nation during post-conflict elections. Some acts of the international oversight include foreign leadership support to the interim host nation government, financial and educational assistance to the electoral commission and logistical support for the elections. This paper has discussed ways that international organizations, the UN and sovereign nations get involved in each of the key components to the elections. It refers to the need for a synchronized effort within the host nation to ensure that elections occur in a timely manner; that topic will be further discussed in the next section. However, not yet discussed is the unification and synchronization by the international community to provide the necessary oversight. In this segment, we will devote the discussion of **international oversight** to the need for synchronization and unification, the ways the international community can shape the environment for post-conflict elections, and the role the CJTF plays in the international oversight for post-conflict elections.

The best form of international oversight to a host nation election in post-conflict operations is that which consists of multiple counties and organizations, unified in principle, and synchronized during execution by an international committee. Earlier in this essay, we mentioned that the United Nations has provided the synchronizing, and at times the directing of

elections of this type through developing resolutions. That is one way to initiate oversight, but the international community should not limit itself to just the UN. There are two other ways that the international community can shape the environment for unity and synchronization of host nation elections.

The first is by conducting seminars and training prior to conflicts that help define the democratic environment and functions for post-conflict elections. While there is significant diversity between the objectives and endstates of sovereign nations involved and non-governmental organizations involved in post-conflict operations, a common ground can be met when representatives from both attend regularly scheduled seminars.<sup>121</sup> As training and seminars attended by NGOs, IOs and representatives of sovereign nations occur, greater unity of effort will exist in the time of crisis. There are multiple seminars and conferences conducted around the world by the UN, USAID, OSCE and others. However, research conducted for this thesis no identified references to conference and seminars that specifically help synchronize the efforts of international organizations and partner nations for post-conflict elections were found. While the solution for this issue is not within the scope of this thesis, it is something to be considered by the CJTF when attempting to understand the international environment supporting the elections.

The second way for the international community to shape the environment is by providing a public information campaign that provides common knowledge regarding the dynamic nature of post-conflict elections. Examples of a public information campaign are governmental hearings, leadership discussions, published articles and books. The point is that the need for unity will not be understood until it is written about. Additionally, during the electoral

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<sup>121</sup> Dileepan Sivapathasundaram discusses the significant differences between both goals and objectives of sovereign nations and non-governmental organizations in his study “*Elections in Post-conflict Environments: The Role of International Organizations*”. However, the author mentions that there is little research on the unity and synchronization of the efforts of both organizations. While it is not within the scope of this thesis to define synchronization and unity, it is important that these elements should exist between both to maximize the ability to provide international oversight to the host nation during post-conflict elections.

process, official hearings are conducted that define what is ongoing and what is needed. A minor example of how public information can help define unity is with the hearing conducted by the US congress on the eve of the first post-conflict elections in Afghanistan in 2004. In this hearing, it is one of the first discussions of the need to for a greater involvement from the international community to get involved with the electoral process the following spring.<sup>122</sup> While the discussion dealt with the use and involvement of forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the discussion generated the involvement of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the assistance support requirements.<sup>123</sup> The bottom line is that unity and synchronization will occur as a result of dialogue, training and publications prior to the post-conflict and during the preparation to the elections.

The CJTF role in international oversight is to provide accurate assessment of the current situation, and determine what may be needed for a successful election. Of all the key considerations to elections, the CJTF has the least amount of control in international oversight. Routinely, coalition members of the CJTF will only have influence with their own governments. In most cases, the military operates as a subordinate to the legislative body of that country. The CJTF will be composed by elements provided by multiple governments; thus, the CJTF can help prepare the information to ensure that the governments and NGOs are empowered to act together with the same information. This will in turn help shape the international community's ability to shape the environment for international oversight with a public information campaign as defined in the previous paragraph.

The bottom line when discussing international oversight is that as proven from the assessment of elections in Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, Liberia and Mozambique, the greater the international assistance and involvement, the greater the chance for success. In countries where

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<sup>122</sup> United States House of Representatives. *United States Security Policy in Afghanistan on the Eve of National Elections*, Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, 108th Congress, 2nd Session. Serial 108-146. 23 September 2004, pg. 8.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, pg. 28.

there was unity of effort, and synchronization to meet requirements rather than a timeline to elections, the elections proved successful. In countries where the international community failed to provide oversight through financial, technical, or political assistance; such as Ethiopia or Somalia, democracy and elections did not take hold.<sup>124</sup>

### ***Governance and Leadership***

The ability of the host nation government to lead and synchronize efforts in post-conflict elections is second to ethical development as the most important component to the development of a successful election and a future democracy. This section discusses the traits and actions necessary by host nation leaders to direct during elections and the roles of the CJTF in supporting host nation government and leadership.

Leadership starts with the selection of interim leaders who are representative of the local populace who will provide guidance toward the preparation of the elections. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the interim leadership to facilitate and legitimize the execution of the electoral process. Leaders will ensure that the timing of the elections occur when all elements to succeed in the elections are correct. Leaders oversee security, information to the local populace; coordinate the funding from within their government, if possible, and most importantly, they ensure the necessary ethical development is made by all members to look beyond the elections. The interim government will additionally be responsible for developing initial laws that will facilitate the establishment of a constitution. These leaders have significant input to the election of an electoral system. Thus, the interim government must have understanding of the impacts of the selection of an electoral system. Finally, the interim government must abide by the moral principles that support the functions of a representative government as explained in the ethical development section. If interim government lacks the ability to lead the populace through the electoral process with the appropriate use of ethics, their adversaries may create obstacles to

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<sup>124</sup> Krishna Kumar and Marina Ottaway, *Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance – “General Conclusions and Priorities for Policy Research*, pg. 229.

prevent the elections from occurring. Success by an adversary or the threat may happen due to a variety of reasons. With respect to the host nation leadership and government, the following two reasons apply:

- ◆ **Weak leadership elected.** The leadership may have been influenced by threat elements to prevent the elections from occurring. The interim leadership may be corrupt and may be part of the problem as well.
- ◆ **Interim government presents a weak security posture.** If the host nation government does not demonstrate that they are leading the security efforts with the support of the CJTF and all other security elements involved, it may provide a perception of ‘toy government’. This may embolden the threat to conduct take up arms to stop the electoral process and adversaries to create an information environment that support the threat.

It is important for the CJTF to ensure that the interim government selected is vetted and that they do not have a weak posture. Examples of a strong posture for an interim government is discussed in the next paragraph.

The most recent success of leadership and host nation governance is the way Afghanistan’s leadership dealt with the challenges of preparing and executing elections. From the Bonn Agreement of 2001, the requirement was set on the country to execute national and provincial elections no later than June 2004.<sup>125</sup> President Karzai’s assessment that the elections were not going to be safe, that citizens were not fully informed, along with an understanding for the need of an electoral commission to oversee the provincial and national assembly elections, led him to make a decision as interim president to delay the national elections until 9 October 2004. This decision allowed the international community to support the selection and development of a joint electoral management body (JEMB) to oversee many of the key components in Figure 3.<sup>126</sup>

As a function of the governance and leadership, electoral commissions provide the guidance necessary to develop training plans and coordinate with government agencies for the key components in Figure 3. The electoral commission is normally selected by an international

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<sup>125</sup> United Nations Regional Information Center for Western Europe, *Bonn Agreement*, accessed from website <http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm>, created 21 December 2001, accessed 1 October 2006.

<sup>126</sup> Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat, *Final Report, National Assembly and Provincial Council Elections 2005*, <http://www.jemb.org> created 15 November 2005, accessed 1 October 2006, pg.8.

body with agreement of leadership or the populace of the host nation. The commission will conduct the operational task to train the local officials on the electoral process, inform the local populace about electoral process and coordinate for all logistical and personnel support requirements for the elections. In conjunction with international organizations, they assist with the observation of the balloting process. In the Afghanistan, the JEMB worked for two years on a variety of actions to ensure the elections in 2004 and 2005 were a reality. The organization was empowered by the electoral law designed by the Afghani government. The actions of the JEMB are examples of what future elections led by the sovereign nation will look like with the integration of international entities in a supporting role.<sup>127</sup> However, it is worth to note that it is leadership traits of the officials inside the JEMB that allowed for the JEMB to be successful.

The CJTF has an important role in its ability to support the government and leadership in the host nation during post-conflict elections. In this important period, the CJTF within its capabilities, should provide the following functions to help the leadership and governance of the host nation. This is in addition to tasks and actions already mentioned throughout Chapter II.

- ◆ Liaison and planning support to the host nation government to facilitate their decision making process.
- ◆ Take opportunities to present the CJTF as a subordinate or partner to the interim host nation government in charge of the elections. This allows the interim host nation government the opportunity to make all necessary decisions as a sovereign nation.

The CJTF can provide liaison and planning support to the electoral commission through a variety of staff and units. The civil military operations section of the CJTF can provide updated analysis and information to the interim government of the population, social behaviors, economic situation and infrastructure. The CJTF may also provide strategic planning assistance to the interim government to facilitate planning for the elections. This type of involvement may lead to the perception that the CJTF may be attempting to influence the elections. However, the

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<sup>127</sup> Joint Elections Management Body Secretariat, *2005 Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections*, from website <http://www.jemb.org> created 2005, accessed 1 October 2006, pg. 6.

consequences of an uninformed leadership and interim government during this period may cause a failure to establish the appropriate electoral establishment. This could lead to collapse of the interim government and instability. The CJTF should find the right balance of involvement versus influence when operating with the host nation government.

During the electoral process, the CJTF can empower the interim government as a partner or subordinate to the elections. During CJTF operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the CJTF was able to empower the interim government through press releases, joint media briefs, ceremonies and conferences.<sup>128</sup> For example, during CJTF operations in Afghanistan the CJTF held ceremonies beginning in November 2001 to inaugurate the interim government, the Loga Yirga. These ceremonies were held in high esteem by the Afghans as a symbol of the change that was coming ahead. These acts help symbolize the transition necessary and motivated the new establishment validate their actions in developing the electoral systems for the elections in 2004. The CJTF continued the direct support to the government through the elections, which helps reinforce the authority of the government. In August 2005, the CJTF through discussions in the previous years prepared for the Afghan government to consider permanent basing for US Forces. While President George Bush did not give full authority for Afghanistan to take responsibility of the basing situation in Afghanistan, he recognized the interest and the wishes of a sovereign government.<sup>129</sup>

## **CHAPTER II SUMMARY**

The key considerations for a successful post-conflict election mentioned in this chapter require international support and involvement, planning, additional CJTF assets and personnel, and a strong interim government. For the CJTF to have the best chance of success possible, its election plan must address every one of the key considerations mentioned in Chapter II. In every

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<sup>128</sup> In addition to the tasks and actions the CJTF would perform in the other sections of Chapter II.

<sup>129</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC., 6 April 2006, pgs. 8, 22.

post-conflict, the culture and ethnic background within the area of operations does matter in order to determine how much effort within each key component of elections the CJTF going to assert. For example, in Kosovo, while the Albanians and Serbians were at odds with one another, they had some understanding of the European ethics of government representation. This allowed for the focus during those elections to be on administrative actions and economic development than say, on ethical development and governance and leadership. On the other hand, during the preparation for elections in Iraq, since citizens had no experience with the election of a representative government, the CJTF spent more time on ethical development and security than in the Kosovo elections. The CJTF planning construct in supporting host nation elections in a post-conflict environment must be flexible to address these considerations while maintaining its primary mission to provide security. At the same time, this framework can not be so diverse from the current planning process that personnel assigned to the operational planning team are separated from the rest of the staff just to conduct this type of planning. Chapter III discusses a planning framework within the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) phasing construct where the CJTF can address all the key components to post-conflict operations during the conduct of crisis action and deliberate planning.

## **CHAPTER III – CJTF FRAMEWORK FOR POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS**

The CJTF requires a framework for elections utilizing the Joint Operation Planning Process in order to meet all the key considerations for a successful election mentioned in Chapter II. This framework suggestion will facilitate the CJTF planning process for elections, while also informing the staff that may not be familiar with the complexities of elections in post-conflict operations. It will also set forth, in general terms, the actions the CJTF must take to ensure success during elections. This framework will not include every necessary task, effect, and objective. Analysis conducted during the development of the CJTF OPLAN, which oversees the planning for the elections, will define the tasks, effects and objectives for the elections. If the CJTF plans, prepares, and executes elections within the guidelines of this chapter, then the CJTF will have a greater chance of a successful election and ultimately help re-establish host nation sovereignty.<sup>130</sup> This chapter is broken into two sections. The first section consists of the framework methodology. This section presents the framework, provides assumptions and conditions and shares an analysis of how the election phases integrate into the Joint Operations Phasing model provided by Joint Publication 3-0. The second portion is dedicated to describing the five phases of the elections framework (Phase E1-E5).

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<sup>130</sup> A successful election in post conflict operations occurs when the key considerations in post conflict operations (figure 3) have been met under legitimate conditions. Ultimately, the host nation and the international community will determine whether the elections were legitimate and successful. For the purposes of this monograph, some measures for the CJTF and the international community to determine a successful election are provided below. Additionally, these measures can be used for initial planning by the CJTF or an electoral commission when attempting to determine objectives or measures of effectiveness:

- The political parties and voters took part in the campaigning process. An understanding of the main political issues was understood by most citizens.
- Citizens were informed of the political process; a majority of citizens understands what their vote means in the selection of a representative government.
- There were no significant shortage of funding to limit the logistical support of the execution of the elections
- The electoral commission and the populace has an understanding of the values of legitimacy as they relate to elections, ethical development is implemented.
- Observation plan that identifies success and assists in correcting errors made throughout the elections is successful and helps bring legitimacy to the elections.
- International support was consistent and assisted in legitimizing the elections in the host nation and internationally.


## METHODOLOGY

This proposed framework is presented in a five-phase construct. This is done to facilitate understanding of the framework, as CJTF staffs will be familiar with the five-phase Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) design.<sup>131</sup> In all phases, the key components of the elections (re: Figure 3) should be addressed. However, in some phases, some components require more attention from the CJTF than others do. Figure 5 shows a pictorial representation of the CJTF elections framework for post-conflict operations and at a minimum, what key components should be addressed. References from various operations, discussion of components of operational design, and the author's experiences were used to develop this framework for a Combatant Command (COCOM) level or a subordinate Combined Joint Task Force.<sup>132</sup> The following paragraphs will present assumptions and the conditions in which the framework can be best explained.

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<sup>131</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations*, pg. IV-27.

<sup>132</sup> The development of the CJTF Elections Framework for Post-Conflict Operations is in large part drawn from the author's experience from multiple operational deployments in Kosovo and Iraq conducting post-conflict elections. See the Acknowledgements and About the Author's section for detailed background on the location and level that the elections were conducted. Whenever possible, references will be presented that additionally support the position of this framework, or alternative ways to address an action for a phasing construct.



**Figure 5 - CJTF Elections Framework in Post-Conflict Operations**

Assumptions to the CJTF elections framework are listed below:

**Assumption #1: International organizations will participate in the development of an interim government for the host nation (international oversight exists).** The international organizations, such as OSCE, EU, and other non-governmental agencies to assist an interim government for elections are present to support. These organizations will attempt to provide impartial support to the host nation to develop for the elections. This assumption will help define ways in which the CJTF can work with these organizations during elections preparations.

**Assumption #2: The CJTF Operations Order for electoral support is designed in the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) construct.** While there are other planning processes within NATO and other international organizations, we assume that the CJTF will execute this mission based on a US military planning construct. This framework can be executed within any type of planning construct; however, to facilitate discussion throughout this chapter as

we have when discussing the US involvement in CJTFs, it is best to use the JOPP phasing construct. An analysis of this assumption is discussed further in this section.

**Assumption #3: The CJTF staff has civil military capabilities and resident knowledge to deal with civil military operations.** While the C3 and C5 staffs will provide the majority of the planning, the analysis for the CJTF will need to reside with civil military expertise that can address some of the coordination with international organizations and the host nation. The civil military planners and staff members will be direct coordinators with international organizations and the interim government electoral commission. The civil military staff will also provide the C3 and C5 with information to provide subordinate units what they need to do at the local level to synchronize the election. However, considerations must be addressed in the event that there is little or no military expertise. Most countries that participate in a CJTF or the COCOM will have little experience with elections, except for some European countries and countries that have participated in UN operations for elections. Therefore, during Phase E1, the CJTF has to take every opportunity to recruit elections expertise or hire private contractors who understand the dynamics of the elections process. These resident experts in turn should train the members of the CJTF staff on the elections process to build a common understanding of how electoral systems work, the cultural areas that the CJTF may need to address in providing ethical development and some of the general logistical requirements that a CJTF may have to provide.

**Assumption #4: The higher echelon HQs or COCOM is capable of conducting some Phase E1 actions.** The CJTF will normally not be created until a warning order or a requirement to conduct combat operations exists. However, the COCOM or the higher echelon US JTF will take responsibility in conducting some shaping operations to facilitate the future work of the CJTF when it is activated. In this, we further assume that the COCOM has some regional understanding of the political situation in the host country that the CJTF is to engage in the future. Examples of some of the tasks are conducting seminars, identifying military support

requirements for the elections, and identifying what electoral form of government is being considered for this host nation.

**Assumption #5: The host nation did not have a democratic form of government prior to the conflict.** Because of the nature of conflict in the last ten years, none of the countries that the United States have been involved has had any form of representative government before the conflict. The CJTF will need to take into consideration the cultural environment, demographics, historical events, and ethical development to define what moral principles are necessary from the CJTF's perspective to help transition the host nation to a democratic or representative form of government.

**Assumption #6: The host nation has very little or no technological capability.** This assumption is realistic to the environment the CJTF will operate during post-conflict operations. Discussion of this framework will address some of the ways that the CJTF can overcome the technological challenges that the host nation will have in planning, preparing and executing elections.

This framework was developed within two defined conditions.

**Condition #1 - The CJTF is preparing for the conduct of the first election after hostilities ended.** The first elections after the completion of combat operations are the most difficult to prepare and execute.<sup>133</sup> Ensuing elections will be easier to execute as systems have been established and assessments have been conducted on how to improve them. When discussing elections in this chapter, it will always refer to the first election after post-conflict operations.

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<sup>133</sup> Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Sonderbom, *Post Conflict Risks*, University of Oxford, England, CSAE/EPS 2006-12, Center for Studies of African Economics, 17 August 2006, pg. 11.

**Condition #2 - There are adversaries and threats who will attempt to stop the elections by violent or non-violent means.<sup>134</sup>** When the adversary uses violent means then they become a threat to the host nation and the CJTF. In a post-conflict environment the worst conditions occur when the adversary elements take up arms against the electoral process, and have decided that there they will not transform into the representative form of government and can no longer influence the citizens of the host nation without resorting to violent means. While disarmament is a key point to bringing a peaceful resolution to the conflict, it does not always happen.<sup>135</sup> This framework is designed to address this condition of the post-conflict environment.

### ***How Does This Election Framework Fit within the Joint Operational Phasing?***


Part of the methodology of designing this framework was to conduct a detailed analysis of how the elections phasing will work within a CJTF joint operational phasing. As stated earlier, in order to facilitate understanding in a CJTF staff, the framework has to be a part of the CJTF planning process. Figure 6 below represents the timing of Phases E1-E5 and how each phase fits within the joint operational phasing.

The CJTF will require the most effort, time and resources in order to execute the first election in a post-conflict environment. The CJTF as well as the international organizations normally feel that by executing a successful first election a key task has been accomplished to transition the host nation to sovereign control. There are normally follow-on elections that occur (provincial elections after national elections, or referendum elections for example); these tend to be organized and executed in a faster timeline than the first election. As the electoral system takes shape as a result of the elections, the host nation develops the necessary laws to continue to improve their sovereignty. The intent is that after a rhythm of the electoral process is developed, the host nation is well on its way to establishing civil authority.

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<sup>134</sup> Refer to Chapter II - Electoral Security section for the definition of threats and adversaries for the elections.

<sup>135</sup> Terrence Lyons, *Demilitarizing Politics, Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace*, pgs. 5-7.



**Figure 6 - CJTF Election Framework within a Joint Operations Phasing Model**

Analysis of figure 6 merits that the CJTF considers the timing and tempo of electoral process, establishing legitimacy, and the need for regional and global shaping when planning elections. The following paragraphs address these considerations in detail, utilizing lessons learned from other elections to elaborate on the use of this phasing construct.

The first consideration is further defined by the timing in which the elections will occur and CJTF's assessment of the elections process to determine the tempo. The CJTF needs to have an understanding of the timing first, or the sequence in which the electoral process will take place. When developing a phasing construct, the CJTF will begin to develop the timing of the electoral process by taking into account this monograph's defined threats and adversaries versus CJTF capabilities.<sup>136</sup> However, for elections, the host nation and the international organizations'

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<sup>136</sup> Refer to Chapter II - Electoral Security section for the definition of threats and adversaries for the elections.

capabilities also have to be taken into account. Political reasons may drive how long the CJTF may have to ensure that first elections occur, so the challenge becomes how much effort of the CJTF will have to be applied to the current capabilities of the host nation and the international organizations. In Iraq, the tempo of the elections for 31 January 2005 determined during political discussions between the Iraqi interim government and the United States, and reinforced by the development of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). MNC-I developed their plan with the assumption that the UN would provide some involvement into the elections. However, the UN determined that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) would work in the elections process only as circumstances permit.<sup>137</sup> The UN working as circumstances permit meant that unfortunately during preparations for the 31 January 2005 elections, the UN provided little if any assistance to key elections process. Thus, NGOs followed the same protocol procedures, with many excusing themselves from supporting because of the security situation. In the Salah ad Din province of Iraq, one NGO (IRI) was scheduled to visit and talk with Provincial leaders on 20 December 2005, but their flight was cancelled and never rescheduled. The burden for educating both the local populace and its leaders fell on local military units. The training of the International Electoral Commission – Iraq (IEC-I) was so weak that it required MNC-I to utilize host nation security forces to train them on elections tasks in order for the elections to be executed.<sup>138</sup> Had periodic analysis been conducted to determine that tasks were not being accomplished, it may have prevented a last minute rush to get the elections performed properly.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1546*, New York, 8 June 2004, pg. 3.

<sup>138</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, *Seeds of Liberty - Elections After Action Report*, Tikrit, Iraq, 2 February 2005.

<sup>139</sup> Assessments made by the author from working directly with provincial IEC-I director who refused to provide information throughout the process on what actions needed to be done for the elections. The effect was occurring through the other provinces in the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division's area of responsibility, which included 3 additional provinces.

The assessment by the CJTF to determine what phase the operation is in, is something that the CJTF should execute continuously to ensure that they maintain tempo in the electoral process. Constant adjustments need to be made to determine where in the phasing construct the CJTF and the host nation are in post-conflict elections. There is risk when the CJTF makes direct claims to a particular phase of elections to show progress when the host nation may claim another or the situation may not support these claims. If the citizens gains even a perception that the claims of the host nation and the CJTF measures of progress are not correct, then there is risk that the elections may be considered illegitimate. Therefore, legitimate elections need to be appropriately assessed, otherwise it may detrimental to the overall post-conflict operation with the current and any following elections. The reason is that the center of gravity to the election, the citizens, will not continue to support illegitimacy for long and will begin undermine the process.<sup>140</sup> The CJTF should focus on what it takes to have legitimacy at every phase of the election and how the host nation and populace will be able to understand it.

Another consideration in this framework is the concept of legitimate progress. Multiple elections do not equal moving to a further phase in the elections framework or in the joint operational phasing, but successful elections do. It has been assumed in the framework that all elections will be successful and facilitates the transitioning process. Although not depicted in Figure 6, a case may occur in which other objectives of Phase V have not been met and follow on elections may occur while in a Phase IV. If one was to determine with the JOPP phasing construct what phase the CJTF is operating in Iraq, one would notice that we are in Phase IV instead of Phase V. The security situation, an inappropriate electoral system, and the lack of ethical development of the people and politicians to understand the moral principles of the

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<sup>140</sup> Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States; Lessons and Challenges*, Prepared for the National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security and America's Purpose, Washington DC, 6-7 September 2005, pgs. 6-9. The author discusses at length the challenges of how a legitimate elections is only a portion of the overall legitimacy needed to establish democracy in post conflict environment.

elections have left MNC-I with still having to provide support to stability rather than enhancing the civil authority.

The last consideration for this framework is that the CJTF as a military entity will need support from a military higher headquarters to handle theater and global support requirements. During the elections process it is important that there is positive regional or global support for the success of the elections. The CJTF is not capable of meeting the requirements of post-conflict operations in a host nation as well as building regional support. In places like Iraq and Afghanistan a Combatant Command (COCOM) headquarters, like Central Command and European Command respectively, are suitable to handle such a task. The COCOM, through engagements and theater security cooperation plans, can provide emphasis to the countries of a region the need to support the elections and deny the adversaries any safe haven to threaten the elections process. In Figure 6, these actions are portrayed at the top of the graph.

## PHASES OF THE FRAMEWORK<sup>141</sup>

### *Phase E1 – Building the Team*




Figure 7 - Phase E1; Building the Team

During Phase E1 the focus of effort for the CJTF is to all shaping activities necessary to prepare the CJTF staff to plan for elections. During this phase, the CJTF or the higher headquarters must shape the environment to facilitate the conduct of host nation elections after a possible conflict.<sup>142</sup> If the CJTF is active, they will work on the tasks of this phase of the framework from its activation until the ‘Dominate phase’ of combat operations.<sup>143</sup> The CJTF should start with gaining support or cooperating with interagency partners, NGOs and IOs that are conducting research or seminars on the country that the CJTF will be conducting

<sup>141</sup> Every phase will have the highlights from Figure 5 to facilitate reader understanding.

<sup>142</sup> If the CJTF does not exist, the higher headquarters, or COCOM, will have to conduct the phase 1 portion of the framework.


<sup>143</sup> Referring to Joint Publication 3-0’s phasing model, it is Phase III.

operations.<sup>144</sup> The intent is to build relationships with these organizations as early as possible to facilitate coordination as the possibility of elections occurs. Upon the receipt of the mission, the CJTF with the support of higher headquarters should work to gain the information on Figure 7 to determine what support requirements are necessary. These requirements may be in the area of the key components defined on Figure 3. The timing in Phase E1 is relative to the time available before the conduct of combat operations. If the CJTF is in combat operations in a rapid response or as a part of a crisis action plan, such as the operations conducted in Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 attacks, then the higher headquarters may have the responsibility of assisting the CJTF with Phase E1 tasks. The main thing to achieve during this phase of the framework is to define adversaries that the CJTF may come in contact with, determine which organizations are interested and involved in supporting elections, and understanding requirements that the CJTF may have if elections were to take place. Once established, the CJTF should be capable of executing the other phases of the election (Phase E2 through Phase E5) as part of the joint operational phasing (Phase I-Deter through Phase V-Transition to civil authority).

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<sup>144</sup> According to Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*, the CJTF takes into effect as a result of a warning order or alert order. In this order, the area of operations or country that the CJTF will conduct operations is defined.

## Phase E2 – Election Preparation



**Figure 8 - Phase E2; Election Preparation**

Phase E2 consists of the planning and preparation for the elections. This phase begins immediately after the CJTF has defeated the threat to a point where stability and a possible transition to civil authority can take place. During the second phase (Phase E2), the CJTF starts the design for elections in a post-conflict environment. In this phase, the CJTF will be conducting combat operations and is attempting to define a plan for the future after defeating the adversarial nation. The CJTF staff has an understanding of the electoral system, the challenges to security, and transitioning to civil authority as a result of the host nation culture and ethical development. If the UN or another entity has not done so at this time the CJTF can initiate the planning details by inviting to a planning conference all NGOs, IOs, host nation and interagency entities that can contribute to the elections. If it has not already been done at the political and strategic level, an interim host nation government selected can lead the planning of the elections process. An example of this type of meeting would be the Bonn Agreement in 2001 hosted by the UN. In this meeting, Afghan interim leaders came together with UN, US and international

officials (with some representation of the CJTF) and signed the agreement on how the country would be rebuilt.<sup>145</sup> The meeting defined the interim government organization, the electoral system that was to be used, the design of a new constitution and an elections timetable.<sup>146</sup> The results of the Bonn process provided an understanding to the Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) and the International Stability Afghanistan Force (ISAF) of the security requirements and the needs to assist the Afghan government develop an electoral commission that addressed the issues that would arise. As a result of the Bonn Agreement, a clear understanding of what was needed to plan for the elections was identified in time for CFC-A and ISAF to provide necessary security and electoral support. The military should lead the planning for the elections only as a last resort. If it does lead the planning, it should be in the context of the most common planning process for all parties involved. Otherwise, the CJTF will need to train those involved in the planning process as well.

Three items from Figure 8 should be emphasized. The first is the establishment of coordination centers. Within the host nation capabilities, coordination centers should be established regionally, which at a minimum can coordinate the security, rehearsals and any preparation necessary for elections. During the Iraqi elections of January 2005, MNC-I used the provincial joint coordination centers (PJCC) to coordinate at the regional level all security and elections activities. The PJCC were designed during the summer of 2004 to meet regional security coordination requirements between the Iraqi military, police and multinational forces. As these centers gained the technological capabilities to communicate, they provided a very convenient entity to support the elections and include members of IEC-I and other ministries who were responsible for the execution of the elections. These centers proved invaluable to the

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<sup>145</sup> Tim Youngs, Afghanistan: The Culmination of the Bonn Process, Library House of Commons, Research Paper 05/72, London, 26 October 2005, pg. 12.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid, pg. 13.

execution of the elections.<sup>147</sup> Discussion during Phase E4 provides an example of the capabilities of a PJCC during the elections process.

The second point to highlight is determining the cost for the elections process. This is important to be defined early in the process to ensure that the donors are informed and the CJTF can get an assessment of contributions. A lack of contributions from donors will require that the host nation government and international governments that are involved contribute whatever shortages there may be. In Phase E2 we will expand on the role of the host nation government with respect to funding elections.


The final point to highlight is determining how many more additional security forces will be needed for a successful election. As discussed in Chapter II, if the same number of security forces needed for post-conflict operations are utilized to also meet the requirements for the elections, it is likely that a gap will occur and the security of the host nation may be at risk. It is at this point, in Phase E2, that these details are defined so that as the host nation prepares for elections, the international community has ample time to provide the additional requirements necessary for elections.

This phase ends when the announcement of the election date has been verified, the campaigning process has been authorized to begin by the interim host nation government, and the political party and voter registration processes begin. Success in this phase will result in being able to execute Phase E3 and E4 in a more synchronized manner. Failure to establish relationships and coordinate a joint plan on the preparation and execution of the elections can be detrimental to the interim host nation's ability to maintain authority during this period.

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<sup>147</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, *Seeds of Liberty - Elections After Action Report*, pg. 3

### ***Phase E3 – Election Preparation, Campaigning, and Rehearsals***



**Figure 9 - Phase E3; Election Preparation, Campaigning and Rehearsals**

Phase E3 is the most labor-intensive phase of the elections framework for the CJTF and all those involved in the elections process. This phase can begin as early as two years prior to or as late as 6 months from Election Day (E-day). This phase will end when the set up for the election ballots and polling sites commences. During this phase, all entities are conducting the preparation for the elections. The key tasks shown in Figure 3 refer to many of the topics previously discussed in Chapter II. However, we will highlight several areas that the CJTF should understand while executing Phase E3.

The funding allocation must commence during this portion of the elections framework. In most elections, the host nation uses its budget to cover the expenses of the first set of campaigning and election dues. However, depending on the economic situation at the end of the conflict, the host nation may not be able to afford all the funding requirements. It is important that political parties and elections be funded from a public source of funding in order to avoid

private enterprise influence during this period. Therefore, this situation highlights the importance of international donor support to the elections.

At times, international donors may commit to provide funds to a host nation for elections but not follow through and donate in a timely manner. Every effort must be made to ensure that donors that committed to provide funds follow through and donate. The host nation has a primary responsibility to do this, and international governments should assist in influencing the donors to donate as well. There is a point where adjustments to the budgeting will have to be made based on what was allocated from donors to support the elections. If possible, the CJTF should be funded to cover some of the elections expenses (perhaps in the security and logistical areas) in the event that a significant budget deficit occurs.

Rehearsals are the best way to prepare for the execution of elections. At a minimum, every 90 days from the beginning of this phase, the host nation or the electoral commission should hold a security or election rehearsal. If either of these entities can not perform the task, the CJTF must take the lead to ensure that representatives from those involved in the elections are present and can provide updates and actions during these events. The rehearsal should be simple to follow by all involved, yet thorough enough that any deficiencies can be identified and resolved.

Although not mentioned in Figure 9, observers and media participation are necessary to provide assessments during this phase. Observers are associated with Election Day operations; however, if observers are present throughout the preparation and campaigning, it may provide a better opportunity for them to assess where things may go wrong on election day. In this framework, the CJTF must do everything possible to get observers present to support the electoral process as early as possible in this phase. The CJTF can serve as an indirect observer to assess the population, but it should only be done as a last resort.

The key to an election plan is the planning itself. The communication between the host nation, the CJTF and key organizations providing support will only help develop a better plan.

The rehearsals, public information program, and opinion polls provide a general assessment, but planning provides direction. There should be a constant update to the election plan presented every 30 days at every level, national, regional, and local. The preferred lead for planning is the host nation or the host nation electoral commission. The CJTF leads the planning only if the situation demands it. That way if there are any significant changes to be made, they are not attributed to undue influence from a foreign military.

An example of Phase E3 operations and the labor challenges was the preparation during the elections of January 2005 in Iraq. MNC-I subordinate units took steps to prioritize security and ethical development after realizing in November that many of the citizens were not aware of the elections and the issues.<sup>148</sup> In the Salah Ad Din province, the security design was determined at the local city level in the coordination centers and further approved by the provincial government, facilitated by a provincial coordination center. All the cities in the province had the inner security of elections and governmental sites with host nation security forces and the area security with coalition forces. With respect to ethical development, leaders and staff members in the MNC-I subordinate units assisted the host nation local authorities, held debates to clarify positions on issues, educated the public in coordination with IEC-I workers, and assisted with the delivery of election products during patrolling operations. While the top UN electoral official at the time complained that the multinational forces were getting involved too much by delivering elections material, there was truly no other choice.<sup>149</sup> The electoral commission was simply not present or unable to deliver any information to the citizens.

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<sup>148</sup> Karen Guttery, *Elections in Iraq: Managing Expectations*, Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 2, Center For Contemporary Conflict – Naval Post Graduate School, California, February 2005, pg. 2.

<sup>149</sup> Colum Lynch, *U.S. Troops' Role In Iraqi Elections Criticized – UN Official Assails Distribution of Material*, pg. A14.

## Phase E4 – E-Day Operations




Figure 10 - Phase E4; Elections Day (E-Day) Operations

During Phase E4 the citizens of a host nation can overcome almost any obstacle or adversaries of the election process if they have security and the moral understanding of the importance of being informed on the issues to make an educated choice. There can only be success in Phase E4 if all the major tasks presented have been achieved. The adversary and any remaining threats will attempt to disrupt every phase of this operation. During E-Day operations, the CJTF needs to have its tactical units pay particular attention to the threat conducting tactical actions against voters. At the operational level, the CJTF has to ensure that its subordinate operational level headquarters focus on the adversary and their messages to citizens to intimidate or challenge the voters from voting or selecting a candidate of their choice. The CJTF headquarters has a holistic view of E-Day operations by focusing on the actions of the

populace.<sup>150</sup> Phase E4, the results will ultimately show if the host nation, the CJTF and those international organizations involved in the elections were successful in assisting the populace.

This phase begins with the establishment of the polling sites and the set up of the logistical infrastructure to deliver elections materials forward. This process can take from a few days to two weeks to complete. The CJTF and the host nation should have resolved how the electoral workers travel to and from their place of duty safely, if there was a centralized subsistence plan, and the forms of communication throughout this period. This phase ends with the completion of the ballot count and the safe return of electoral employees to their home stations. The most important actions that the CJTF can do during this phase are to provide security, ensure that the message of legitimacy is delivered, and provide support to the host nation leadership in the event of a crisis. Most of the coordination that needs to be performed during this phase can be accomplished by a well designed coordination center.

The coordination centers provide the necessary information of what is ongoing during the elections process and what immediate actions need to be taken. They should be located at the local, regional and national levels. They should be composed at a minimum of representatives from security, public information, the CJTF, and the electoral commission. These members will be at a centralized location that can facilitate communication with the necessary authority to address immediate issues. CJTF should keep in mind that no two centers may look alike as different locations will have different organizations based on unique situations. However, the coordination centers will need a full complement of communications equipment and computers to be able reach any location.

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<sup>150</sup> Earlier in this monograph (referenced in Electoral Security section in Chapter II) we defined threats and adversaries. If the CJTF has performed the appropriate mission analysis, they should be able to determine which threats will take actions during E-Day operations and provide the additional security capabilities to subordinate units to combat against these. With respect to adversaries, the CJTF, with support of the host nation and the international organizations, will have knowledge at this time of the adversary to the elections. The CJTF can then apply the appropriate information operations support to mitigate messages and actions that the adversaries may have planned for E-Day operations.

One example of the ability of a coordination center to react quickly to a crisis was during the author's experience during the January 2005 elections.<sup>151</sup> In the Salah Ad Din province the polling stations opened at 0700 that morning with concerns that in the city of Samarra, because of the security situation, citizens might not turn out to vote. As of 1000, Al Jazeera posted in its televised programming that the Samarra polling stations were not open at all and for citizens not to go. The coordination center had rehearsed a reaction plan for an event such as this. A media representative assigned to the coordination center, contacted the Al Jazeera headquarters in Syria and Jordan and within 22 minutes a follow on posting was delivered stating that the polling stations had been opened since 0700. As soon as that report was sent, voters commenced to turn out to the polling stations to vote.

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<sup>151</sup> The coordination center in discussion is the Salah Ad Din Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC). The PJCC was designed initially to coordinate security efforts in the province from the different ministries in order to provide the governor with a security situation. The PJCC evolved to being able to coordinate a variety of issues that ranged through all the ministries. The PJCC was Iraqi led, multinational forces funded initially and later funded by the Iraqi government once it was established in December 2005. The PJCC today conducts intelligence coordination between security forces, conducts research on issues that are of importance to the citizens and recommends solutions to the Provincial leadership.

## Phase E5 – Post-Election Operations




Figure 11 - Phase E5; Post Election Operations

The last phase of this framework, (Phase E5) focuses on facilitating transition of power to an elected government, gathering lessons learned from all participants, and doing all necessary actions to prepare for future elections in that host nation. The CJTF will be required to maintain or increase security levels, gather information on what to improve in the elections, and facilitate the transition from an interim government to a representative government. This phase begins at the completion of ballot counting and the winners of the elections have been determined officially. This phase ends when the elected host nation government is sworn in and preparation for the next election has begun. The items of importance to expand upon during this phase are the message of legitimacy, the increase of security operations and how the CJTF can influence planning for the following election.

The message of legitimacy is critical for the CJTF and the host nation to gain the momentum necessary for a representative form of government to take place. During this phase, the CJTF must help the host nation echo the message of a successful election, if it occurred. This

message will help the citizens understand that the process worked and that in the future, their participation will have meaning.

What happens if there were significant errors and the elections were not legitimate? Does the host nation, international community and others minimize the errors and still claim it legitimate? How should the CJTF operate in this environment? These are some of the most challenging questions that the CJTF will face as they conduct the first election.

The answer to these questions is that the CJTF will have to take drastic measures to either execute the election again or correct the errors in such a manner that legitimacy can be obtained. If the CJTF achieved Phase E1 and E2 properly, the team that is built should have a portion of the plan that addresses this type of situation. It is not within the scope of this thesis to address all the areas that may create a situation for illegitimate elections. However, the CJTF with a team concept to the elections can overcome many of the issues that may challenge the legitimacy of the elections.

The CJTF in coordination with host nation security should have a follow on plan to surge security capabilities following an elections. The possibility of the threat physically attacking key governmental locations as well as adversaries conducting information operations to denounce these leaders is much greater. However, the CJTF will normally peak security operation support to the host nation during Phase E4, however, as the representative government is identified and sworn in. No unclassified research shows exists an increase of attacks in a post-conflict environment as a result of the success of the elections in locations where a CJTF is involved. However, it is worth noting that the CJTF should conduct analysis on the possibility of this event for all coalition partners to become aware of the situation.

The planning for future elections must be initiated immediately after the first election. As the CJTF transitions units and key leadership, resident expertise may depart who conducted important analysis or built key relationships with host nation government and international organizations. Due to lack of experience in elections and the excitement of a new representative

governing body, the host nation may not begin to plan for a follow on election immediately, or with a sense of urgency. Lastly, the international organizations may have been committed to conduct one election and restructuring may occur within the international organization previous capabilities remain past the first election. Therefore, the only organizations that can preserve the continuum of the elections planning are the CJTF and the host nation government (using their electoral commission). These organizations must come together immediately and define the general requirements necessary to conduct the next elections. Once that is completed, then the CJTF as well as the host nation should begin the next elections Phase E1 and build the team again.

### **CHAPTER III SUMMARY**

The elections framework should help facilitate the planning, preparation and execution of elections in post-conflict operations. This framework allows a CJTF staff member or planner to gain a perspective of the diversity of tasks across DIMEFIL that they will have to address in order to have success in elections.<sup>152</sup> The key points for the CJTF to understand are:

- ◆ The elections process is not something that is planned just after the cessation of major combat operations; rather it begins as soon as the CJTF has a mission that may involve the reconstruction and enabling of a new civil authority in threatening sovereign nation.
- ◆ CJTF will need to assess or take action in every key component mentioned in Chapter 2. The CJTF cannot be ‘hands off’ in an area like Economic Support because they have no direct financial relationship with the election process.
- ◆ The CJTF should do everything possible from taking assets and capabilities necessary to conduct security tasks and utilize them to perform election support tasks. The possibility of using subordinate organizations within the CJTF to provide elections support beyond that of security can be detrimental to the overall security of the host nation.
- ◆ The CJTF is not alone! There are other organizations (NGOs, IOs and interagency) who will participate in the elections process. It is the CJTF’s responsibility to do everything possible identify who these organizations are, and create liaisons at the lowest levels possible. Otherwise, the CJTF may find itself performing tasks that other organizations could perform or doubling efforts where it is not necessary.

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<sup>152</sup> DIMEFIL - Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics, Finance, Intelligence, Law Enforcement

## **CHAPTER IV – FUTURE CONCEPTS AND CONCLUSION**

### **FUTURE CONCEPTS**

In the future, CJTFs will be more involved in nation building and post conflict operations, which will often include the conduct of post-conflict elections. This means that the international military establishments must begin to train staffs and units to deal with the complexities and challenges of post-conflict elections. The framework provided in Chapter III of this monograph will assist a CJTF attempting to build a team with other international organizations to assist with the conduct of host nation elections in a post-conflict environment. In the future, it would be best to have a team made up of organizations assisting with the conduct of host nation elections that includes the CJTF, rather than the current situation. The current nature of national and international policies is not conducive to integrating all vital instruments of national power for the conduct of post-conflict elections, which we have determined critical to meeting the key components to elections in Chapter II. While the framework provided in Chapter III is suitable to conduct elections and help build the instruments of national power today, there are better ways to execute elections in post-conflict environments in the future. In the following paragraphs, some concepts are introduced for international militaries to pursue in order to facilitate future post-conflict elections.

The first concept, which can have immediate positive impact, is that the military components create or modify specialized civil military organizations that deal with the conduct of post-conflict elections. An example of this type of organization would be adjusting the US Army's civil affairs Crisis Action Team B (CAT-B) with an additional specialty to perform duties in this type of scenario. As a CJTF is formed, this team can augment the CJTF and train the staff, participate in planning and train staff members on the concept of elections and the key components defined in Chapter II of this thesis. For the US military in the previous example, the cost would only be the additional training requirements to a current CAT-B team. An appropriate

training regimen for this type of team at a minimum should be to attend a formalized election training program with the UN, IDEA or USAID. These teams should also attend formal institutional education on international relations, humanitarian assistance and electoral systems. A team for this type of specialty can be trained in approximately 18 months, with refresher training every 6 months in order to maintain current on the current post-conflict election issues.

A second concept that the militaries can do to ensure some experience is present in post-conflict elections is to develop regional military expertise through regional cooperation. The international military establishment at the regional level (equivalent of a US military Combatant Command - COCOM), should implement the attendance to seminars and workshops hosted by NGOs and other governmental agencies in the conduct of post-conflict operations as part of that military's theater security strategy. While members attending these seminars may not always discuss elections, they will meet members of other government agencies and NGOs that in a time of crisis will have a better understanding of one another. The cost to doing such an action is minimal to the military establishments and the relationships created can have a positive lasting effect.

The final concept when it comes to improving the military capability for executing elections is to include elections as a part of a major exercise program (computer exercise program - CPX) that is dealing with post conflict operations. During most exercises that deal with post conflict operations, very little is trained or exercised with the conduct of elections and consideration to the overall mission as a result of supporting. Militaries require some form of training exercise that deals with the conduct of the elections. If given a challenging exercise where as a military organization they have to work to build the teams, deal with the challenges of an interim host nation government, and conduct planning for elections; the CJTF will benefit with expertise when established. However, the cost of such an exercise can be costly, and the recurrence of these types of exercises will have to be done routinely (about every 4 years) as senior military staffs change.

## CONCLUSION

This monograph provides the CJTF staff familiarity of the elections process, the key components necessary for a post-conflict election to be successful and an operational level framework that will facilitate the integration of the host nation, NGOs and IOs into a joint operational phasing. This was done by presenting the reasons why the CJTF should be involved in the elections, present the elections environment and presenting a framework and future concepts to operate in that environment. The main points to be learned from this monograph are:

- ◆ **The CJTF must be fully involved in the elections process.** It is detrimental to the United States strategy for winning in post conflict operations if the CJTF does not have full involvement in the process.
- ◆ **When elections are successful, they can serve as an event that provides education, understanding and progress to a host nation gaining some democratic form of government.** Elections will not be perfect every time, but the repetition of them in a consistent manner, will help cultures gain experience on the power of making political choices. Ultimately, the host nation will end up with a form of representative government suitable to their customs and cultural needs.
- ◆ **The CJTF is the most capable organization in the post conflict environment to support or lead an election effort.** While there will be many international organizations with expertise and the host nation is responsible for executing the elections, the CJTF has the most influence and can defeat any of the adversaries or threats to the elections.
- ◆ **CJTFs cannot underestimate the impact of the electoral system for a host nation. The electoral system determines the type of government the host nation will have.** There are advantages and disadvantages to them shown in Chapter II of this monograph. The CJTF staff must do some critical analysis of all the possible repercussions of the electoral system in the host nation.
- ◆ **The key considerations in post conflict operations provide a guide of understanding to the CJTF staff.** These nine considerations (International and Strategic Oversight, Host nation Governance and Leadership, Observer Plan, Electoral Administration, Public Information Program, Logistic Preparation, Ethical Development, Economic Support and Regional and Local Security) will require at a minimum some semblance of unity of effort by the CJTF, the host nation and NGOs and IO. The dynamics of executing these against threats and adversaries as defined in this document while trying to train the host nation to understand a new form of governmental process proved to be the challenge for the CJTF.
  - **Security and Economic support are the most important components to any election to have a chance for success.**
  - **While all nine considerations are important, ethical development is the decisive element to a successful election.** If there is ethical development within the host nation to not just vote, but accept the principles to voting, the ultimate chance for success in establishing a representative form of government is greater.

- ♦ **The Framework for the CJTF to conduct elections provided allows the CJTF to synchronize joint operational phasing with the actions necessary to execute the elections.**
  - **The planning and execution of the first election will be developed in a joint campaign planning construct from initial activation of the CJTF possibly through the end of Phase IV.** While conducting combat operations during Phases I-III, the CJTF will attempt to address Phase E1 and E2, they will outline who will participate in an elections process and address gaps in capabilities, processes and procedures. As the CJTF conducts this assessment, it can additionally coordinate and train with elements that will participate in the elections process in the future. While the CJTF may be focusing its priority of effort in dominating through military efforts the threat during Phase III, it has to also take into account what preparation it can initiate, in particular the ethical development. At this point, the international organizations can help the CJTF by organizing and collecting the necessary materials that will go forward to the host nation.
  - **As major combat operations cease, the introduction of election campaigning and the implementation of temporary laws and authorities by an interim government will be consistent with Phase IV in the joint operational phasing, and Phase E3 in the electoral framework.** The CJTF should not be focusing on one election, but the necessary elections to help establish the representative government of the host nation. Therefore, some of phase E1 and E2 activities may continue as result of getting more organizations involved and further defining what governmental changes need to be made. As the first elections occur, it will be the first step to getting a representative form of government in place. Assuming that other objectives in Phase IV have been met, the CJTF will normally transition to Phase V in the joint operation-phasing model, enabling civil authority.
  - **The elections play a decisive point to the transition of the host nation, thus the execution of the elections has its own phase.** Phase E4 deals with the execution of the election itself and all that is necessary to make it legitimate. It is during this phase that the likelihood of adversaries utilizing violent means to discourage voting will likely occur. Success on Phase E4 is subject to the success of the security provided as well as the ethical development. The citizens of a host nation can overcome almost any obstacles or adversaries of the election process if they have security from the threat and the moral understanding of the importance of being educated in the issues to make an educated choice.
  - **Phase E5 of the elections framework should tie in with the next set of elections that will assist the host nation gain full sovereignty.** Phase E5 of the first election will be within the Phase V of joint operational phasing. Figure 6 shows that there will be additional elections to continue to foster the civil authority of the host nation. Assuming that all other objectives that relate with Phase V are being met, the CJTF may have less involvement in follow on elections. Optimally, the CJTF can distance itself over elections and rather than being deeply involved in all key components of the elections be able to focus on security and economic support.

There are no guarantees for the CJTF that using the framework proposed and addressing all the key components to a successful post-conflict election will lead to a prospering post-conflict democracy. Post-conflict elections can help the development of a democracy, but they do not bring democracy. However, when there is a lack of coordination, leadership, and ethical development; the end result is more likely that the host nation does not develop to be a democracy. Therefore, if the international and national entities come together to work on the key elements for elections, the actions will have a profound and positive effect in determining the future of the host nation as a possible democracy. In this event, there is validity in using elections as an intermediate strategic goal to transition a host nation to full sovereignty after post-conflict operations in order to develop a democracy. If the United States, through its representation in a CJTF is to be successful at elections in post-conflict operations, it must involve other government agencies, NGOs and IOs under a framework that includes the key components for elections.

Lastly, elections are about the populace of the host nation. Often, information, adversaries and threats will attempt to take focus away from the electoral process and prevent the CJTF and international agencies abilities to focus on the effect that an election can have. The CJTF has to have the ability to maintain security while providing focus for the populace with respect to elections.

As the CJTF with NGOs and IOs participate in post-conflict operations, it is imperative that all involved understand the basic components to successful elections to develop future democracies. Thus, as soon as the necessary accords, agreements and treaties are conducted to end hostilities, a detailed and organized convention must take place to define the electoral process. Preferably, this type of conference should be performed with the host nation, whether they have the capability to lead themselves or not. Most importantly, the synchronization of all these items has to be performed by leaders of the sovereign nation and supporting international organizations that understand democratic principles in order to enforce the electoral process. The

host nation can achieve its election strategy endstate with use of key components, appropriate timing, and assessments.

Timing and elections assessment are items embedded in the key components to an elections framework that should be taken into consideration as a democratic process is put into place. Timing is critical to determining when it is appropriate to conduct the election, and the effects desired on the local populace. Lastly, election assessment is critical to identify and improve on all components of the elections to meet to an acceptable standard and to provide a starting point to the next step in establishing a representative government.

Finally, the democratic process begins to shape immediately after citizens understand the pillars to Figure 3. As citizens understand the key components of elections, along with the CJTF planning support on executing elections, they will also learn about some key elements of democracy: the freedom of speech, gender and ethnic equality to name a few. The key to elections is not just to vote, but also to learn what a community does in the process. Without security and economic support, elections are unlikely to happen. Without the pillars, it is unlikely that democracy will ever take root, even if the country may have previously been a democracy. The strategic win for democratic development is the successful transition of the pillars in Figure 3 from an international / US entity to the host nation government. The threat and adversaries that will challenge the elections will be many. It is imperative that all entities involved in an electoral process after post-conflict operations understand the importance of executing the pillars at the conclusion of post-conflict operations and are able to transfer them to the host nation government over time.

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## **ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

Major Jose H. Ocasio-Santiago is an Infantryman currently assigned as a student at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk, Virginia studying to be a planner at the Joint and Combined Staff level. He is a 1995 graduate from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, where he earned degrees in Mathematics and in Education. Major Ocasio is also a 2000 graduate of the USMC Amphibious Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia.

His previous leadership assignments include Rifle Platoon and Antiarmor Platoon Leader with the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington; Commander of a Mechanized Infantry and Division Headquarters companies in Germany with the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division. Of significance while serving in these positions, he was involved during OIF with Turkish forces in the development of an air point of debarkation at Oguzeli, Turkey. His work with Muslim leaders and military officials helped develop him for experiences in post-conflict elections in Iraq.

Major Ocasio has had first hand experience with elections in post-conflict operations. During Operation Joint Guardian, Major Ocasio took part in the Multinational Brigade East operations in Gnjilane Kosovo as a Civil-Military Operations Officer in 2002. The most significant task was coordinating the military efforts to Kosovo's first municipal elections. He was directly responsible for coordinating the ballot escort, security operations and coordinating the public information program. Gnjilane is a 90,000 citizen municipality in southeastern Kosovo consisting of 60% Albanians 35% Serbs, and 5% of a variety of cultures.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom II, Major Ocasio performed duties with elections while assigned as a Brigade Planner. In November 2004, having completed duties as a planner for Operation Baton Rouge, the decisive combat operation in Samarra, he was assigned to assist the Iraqi local government to execute the first ever elections in the Salah Ad Din Province on January 30, 2005. Salah Ad Din province has 1.1 million people, 80% of them Sunni, 15% Shia, and 5% Kurd. Major Ocasio found himself developing or coordinating with Iraqis every facet of the elections - primarily security ethical development, economic support, and logistical preparation.